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Corporate Accountability and Human Rights of Transnational Companies in Zimbabwe’s Mineral Extractive Industries

  • Human Rights Research Center
  • Jul 8
  • 25 min read

Author: Gaynor Vambe

July 8, 2026


Bikita Minerals' new spodumene plant [Photo credit: Newzwire]
Bikita Minerals' new spodumene plant [Photo credit: Newzwire]

Introduction


Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in Southern Africa that is richly endowed with a variety of mineral resources, including lithium, gold, platinum, nickel, and chrome (Murombo, 2010). Zimbabwe’s mining sector is dominated by transnational mining corporations, particularly in lithium, platinum, gold, and diamonds, with foreign companies such as Valterra Platinum, Implats, Bravura, and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co. Ltd. These companies play a central role in various mining operations like financing, extraction, and mineral export.  Reports indicate that in 2023, Chinese companies secured investment contracts in Zimbabwe valued at $2.79 billion. For countries such as Zimbabwe, which rely heavily on mining revenues for socio-economic development, it is prudent to establish corporate accountability mechanisms in the foreign-dominated mining sector. Such dominance creates a paradox between foreign investment and the need to safeguard national development priorities and the human rights of mine-host communities. This is because transnational companies are key players in mineral investment in Zimbabwe. They are essential for supplying minerals that underpin global industries and development. Critical minerals such as lithium are vital for renewable energy technology and climate change mitigation (Buhmann, 2023). This demonstrates the paradox that foreign investment is critical for economic growth and integration into global mineral supply chains, yet it simultaneously poses risks to human rights, environmental protections, and equitable local development in Zimbabwe. 


In this context, strengthened corporate accountability measures in the mining regulatory framework become important to secure a balance between the competing imperatives in mineral extraction. Corporate accountability is understood as the public examination of corporate decision-making regarding public goods and processes, shaped by the power dynamics between corporations and citizens (Moldalieva, 2021). Mining operations often generate severe human rights and environmental harms for local communities, thereby necessitating robust transparency and corporate accountability mechanisms to ensure that communities do not bear the burden of Zimbabwe’s mineral exploitation by transnational mining companies. An analysis of mining economies shows Zimbabwe has almost no governance framework to ensure resource extraction proceeds in a sustainable, transparent, and equitable manner (Olawuyi, 2018). The vast mineral wealth of Zimbabwe has been considered to be a pillar of its economic growth for many years. 


The Zimbabwean legal framework provides a foundation for citizen involvement in balancing out corporate power over mineral wealth. It promotes stakeholder consultation when granting mining rights, as provided under the Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 21:05]. The Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 21:05] was drafted and enacted while Zimbabwe was a British colony. Its intent was to benefit the colonial regime rather than the country’s black majority by legitimising the channelling of wealth into the hands of the elite and the exclusion of mine-host communities (Chagadama & Viljoen, 2024). Catering to the regime’s interests instead of those of the Zimbabwean people created socio-economic challenges, including failure to translate mineral wealth into tangible socio-economic benefits for Zimbabwe itself. The Mines & Minerals Bill, 2025 was drafted to address the gaps in the Mines and Minerals Act, with the objective of modernising Zimbabwean mining laws by bolstering environmental restoration, indigenisation, transparency, accountability, community participation, compensation, and benefit sharing. The Bill still requires improvements by aligning it with global best practices like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which emphasises standardised revenue-disclosure tracking. The Bill also fails to provide for human rights due diligence as provided by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Additionally, the Bill is silent on free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) principles such as disclosure of mining contracts, public access to information, and local community involvement in decision-making processes (Mapuvire & Mukonza, 2025). These concerns provide an important basis for examining the broader governance and caccountability challenges that continue to characterise Zimbabwe’s mining sector and the extent to which it impacts the protection and promotion of socio-economic rights in mine-host communities.


In contrast, Botswana’s mineral governance framework demonstrates how a centralised state-corporate partnership model of resource governance can bolster transparency and accountability in mining policies to utilise mineral wealth, protect human rights, and foster responsible investments (Mueller, 2024). The core of Botswana’s success in mineral extraction, particularly diamond extraction, is that it has maintained a stable regulatory environment mainly through a direct involvement in decision-making processes over investment and development (IDEA, 2025). Learning from other regional jurisdictions such as Botswana and borrowing best practices from global mining regulatory frameworks such as the EITI and UNGPs, Zimbabwe can adopt corporate accountability principles of transparency, community participation, environmental protection, and human rights protection that are not only essential to create an attractive mining investment destination but also create a mining economy that values the rights of mine-host communities. Corporate accountability in the mining sector provides a critical pathway to the protection of socio-economic rights of mine-host communities in Zimbabwe. 


Evidence of Weak Corporate Accountability


The lack of corporate accountability emerges in several different ways, including environmental degradation, regulatory non-compliance, and the exclusion of local community voices. This is because mining companies are operating in an environment where prioritising profits over the welfare and socio-economic development of mine-host communities is legally permissible. Weak corporate accountability measures contribute to practices that lead to mining companies utilising substandard environmental safeguards, exclusion of community-driven decision-making processes, poor resource management, resource theft, governmental corruption, poor labour conditions, land grabs & forced evictions from ancestral lands, and unfair compensation for relocation of community residents (Chagadama & Viljoen, 2024; Grand, 2024). This raises the question of when and how local mine-host communities can derive real benefit from the extraction of mineral resources from their communities.¹ These challenges underscore the urgent need to establish and strengthen corporate accountability measures in the mining sector. Such measures are vital for prioritising transparency, community involvement, environmental protection, and the protection and fulfilment of socio-economic rights of mine-host communities.


These accountability challenges are further exacerbated by some of the existing ownership structures in Zimbabwe, which locate dominant control of mining operations in foreign transnational corporations, normally at the expense of community involvement in mineral resource governance and community benefit-sharing.   These concerns are illustrated by the developments at Bikita Minerals Mine, where a Chinese mining firm named Sinomine Resources Group holds 100% ownership. The lack of localised stakeholder oversight at this mine raises important questions about accountability and community welfare. With demand for critical minerals expected to rise, nations like Zimbabwe, that contribute to the global supply of lithium metal, lithium ore, spodumene, and/or lepidolite, are poised to become global players in the lithium trade (Grand, 2024). This sudden boom in lithium demand is due to the global transition to clean energy that has led to the production and use of lithium-ion battery technology. This is used as renewable energy storage, a driving force of electric vehicles (Symington, 2025). If Zimbabwe can maintain the supply of this critical mineral, there is a high probability of increased socio-economic development in Zimbabwean communities due to potential increases in investment (ZELO, 2025). Mineral resource exploitation is not an automatic guarantee of socioeconomic progress. The absence of corporate accountability measures all but guarantees regression of socio-economic development, as this creates a business environment in which harmful practices thrive. 


Consequently, the concentration of control by foreign transnational mining corporations and the lack of local stakeholder involvement in resource governance often lead to mining corporations externalising social and environmental costs of their mining operations to mine-host communities. Moreso, this occurs in mine-host communities without any real developmental benefit accruing to them, a phenomenon closely linked to the concept of the “resource curse.” This curse describes developing countries like Zimbabwe, which are rich in natural resources but experience low socio-economic development compared to resource-poor countries (Chagadama & Viljoen, 2024). The term “resource curse” was first coined by Professor Richard Auty in 1993 as an economic theory and tool, which describes “the tendency of mineral-rich economies to underperform in economic growth and other development outcomes” (Gilberthorpe & Papyrakis, 2015). Despite the abundance of mineral wealth, widespread poverty persists, driven by mineral exploitation by external actors, including transnational corporations and politically connected elites (Chagadama & Viljoen, 2024). Reports have been made of benefits accruing to the “politically connected” through corruption, direct state & military ownership, and systemic revenue leakages for the benefit of mining companies (Grand, 2024: CNRG).  Governmental officials and local leadership, such as local authorities and traditional leaders, have been reported to be working in cooperation with mining companies to undercut the community consultation process (Grand, 2024). In diamond mining, reports show that revenues from the Marange diamond field have been looted by governmental officials, military personnel, and investors (Moyo G. 2020b). This results in an uneven power dynamic between political elites, mining corporations, and the mine-host communities for control over mineral resource extraction and management. This shows that strong corporate accountability mechanisms are essential in combating transparency gaps that enable revenue leakages through corruption, illicit financial flows, and regulatory non-compliance.


Beyond revenue leakages and corruption, weak corporate accountability has also contributed to significant environmental and socio-economic rights violations in mine-host communities owing to the limited oversight and inadequate community involvement in resource governance. For example, the mining of diamonds and lithium led to the destruction of traditionally sacred grave sites (Grand, 2024). Gold mining in Zimbabwe has negatively impacted communities as there has been a rise in violence, smuggling, and environmental degradation Nyakuwanika & Panicker, 2025. Furthermore, gold mining methods produce toxic compounds such as mercury and cyanide, which pose significant health risks to humans (Nyakuwanika & Panicker, 2025). When these compounds contaminate local water, they can jeopardise agricultural productivity and food security (Nyakuwanika & Panicker, 2025). Another major challenge in Zimbabwe’s mining sector, particularly in lithium mining, is forced displacements and relocations of communities without transparent consultation or fair compensation (Grand, 2024). In addition, lithium mining has further disrupted the livelihoods of community members in mine-host communities by limiting grazing space for cattle in the Buhera, Bikita, and Mberengwa communities (Grand, 2024). The active involvement of communities from the inception of operations to their termination ensures that the concerns and needs of mine-host communities are addressed. This would prevent catastrophes such as water contamination, livelihood disruption, violence, and food insecurity from occurring in mine-host communities. Unchecked actions undertaken by corporations deepen cycles of poverty because communities are left in a far worse socio-economic state than they were before the mining activities. Altogether, these challenges underscore the urgent need for strengthened corporate accountability measures as the current regulatory framework enables mining companies to violate human rights, erode community trust, and to prioritise profit over community wellbeing and development.


Zimbabwe’s Mining Legal Framework and Reform Efforts


The Mines and Minerals Act 38 of 1961 provides a foundation for citizen involvement in balancing out corporate power over mineral wealth. However, the Mines and Minerals Act is also criticised by prominent scholars in this area of research, Mapuvire and Mukonza, for being inconsistent with recent changes in both local and international mining laws. This includes the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) as well as the Africa Mining Vision and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (Mapuvire & Mukonza, 2025).  The EITI provides and guarantees environmental protections, contract transparency, public disclosure of mining revenues, and equitable mineral exploitation. This is not in alignment with the Mines and Minerals Act. 


Among its several shortcomings, the Mines and Minerals Act establishes unconstrained ministerial discretion and contradicts laws that deal with land use (Mapuvire & Mukonza, 2025). Section 2 of the Act provides that land use rights are vested with the President. Apart from creating a hierarchy of mining rights over surface rights or control, this provision takes away community sovereignty over minerals from communities by centralising total control in the office of the President. This excludes mine-host communities from involvement in mineral resource management. This legislation undermines corporate accountability by heavily centralising authority, ignoring the importance of community involvement in mining operations.


Community involvement and meaningful participation in the different stages of mining operations serve the purpose of safeguarding community interest and sovereignty over their own minerals. This structural weakness of the Mines and Minerals Act allows mining companies to bypass several critical environmental and social protections mandated by other laws, notably the Environmental Management Act [Chapter 20:27] and the Communal Land Act. For instance, there are issues of mining companies relocating community members with inadequate compensation in direct contradiction of section 12 of the Communal Land Act (Moyo & Dhlakama, 2019; Grand, 2024). This is due to a procedural circumvention of Part XI of the Environmental Management Act on environmental impact assessments. The Mines and Minerals Act can also override communal land rights. These regulatory inconsistencies create gaps that mining corporations can exploit to undercut meaningful community oversight, thereby undermining corporate accountability and exposing mine-host communities to the risks of human rights violations.


The Mines and Minerals Act went under review because many of its tenets are rooted in the colonial-era elitist control approach. It misaligns with other laws and internationally recognised best practices. Under the Mines and Minerals Act, mining practices are predominantly exploitative, resulting in environmental degradation and the absence of benefit-sharing mechanisms with local communities (Chagadama & Viljoen, 2024). This led to the 2025 Mines and Minerals Bill, which sought to modernise the mining legal framework by designating strategic minerals and aligning mining activities with social and environmental safeguards. This Bill weakens the ability of foreign corporations to maximise profits and prioritises responsible and sustainable mining practices by introducing mandatory social responsibility certificates and contributions to a Mining Industry Environmental Protection Fund. Additionally, large-scale miners must now fund the remediation of environmental damage and prove meaningful community engagement to maintain their mining titles (Mapuvire & Mukonza, 2025). The Bill introduces a licensing framework that could, in theory, regulate mining more effectively. However, corporate accountability is weakened by its vague stipulation of special and unique conditions for the exploration, ownership, exploitation, beneficiation, marketing, and development of the strategic minerals being extracted. It fails to define these conditions, which can lead to loopholes (Mapuvire & Mukonza, 2025). This vagueness contradicts international best practices highlighted in the EITI, which emphasises transparency in the allocation and governance of resources through the adoption of clear and publicly accessible laws that govern licensing, contracts, and revenue flows (Mapuvire & Mukonza, 2025). The neglect to clearly define the conditions attached to the strategic minerals creates strategic ambiguity that allows mining corporations to operate without enforceable obligations regarding accountability practices such as community consultations, compensation/redress, and environmental protection.


In addition to the Mines and Minerals Act, the current mining regulatory framework consists of the Environmental Management Act in Zimbabwe, which mandates that environmental impact assessments (EIA) be conducted before the mining project commencement to prevent environmental harm. The environmental and social impact assessment (EIA) provides an international framework for assessing environmental and social impacts in the surrounding communities of intended mining projects (International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), 2012). Local communities in Zimbabwe are often mistreated by mining companies, who tend to hold post-hoc consultations. These actions violate the processes mandated by EIA (Moyo & Dhlakama, 2019). Community consultations that are conducted as part of the EIA process enable the meaningful and active participation of communities, allowing local communities to advocate for their communal needs and to demand accountability from mining companies. Corporate accountability serves as a principle that fosters transparent business operations, embedded in responsible mining practices. This ensures that communities participate meaningfully through independent oversight of mining activities in their communities, including risk mitigation plans (International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), 2012). If implemented correctly, the EIA can be a crucial instrument in protecting human rights in mine-host communities by ensuring that environmental and social risks are identified, assessed, and mitigated before mining operations commence.


Additionally, the EIA is the key to preserving cultural heritage by providing local communities a platform to meaningfully engage with and share knowledge about their environment and sacred sites. According to section 2 of the Environmental Management Act, places of cultural significance must be protected. Section 6(c)(iii) of the Environmental Management Act provides that one of the duties of the Director-General, inspectors, and other officers is to monitor and regulate “the disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitute the nation’s cultural heritage.” Cultural heritage sites are not just symbols of our identity, but also avenues for generating income through tourism, thereby contributing to Zimbabwe’s socio-economic development and the livelihoods of community members. This is particularly important in dealing with transnational mining corporations that are not well-versed in indigenous knowledge systems and might fail to understand the impact that some of their activities may have on cultural heritage. For example, there is a recent case where communities in Mutare,  a culturally preserved site near a mountain, raised alarm over gold mining activities that are happening in the mountain, with worries that such operations are not just a destruction of their cultural heritage but also may cause environmental disasters like floods when the mountain is destroyed (Sivangani, 2026). In instances where the communities have been engaged and given a platform to raise concerns about their environment, such negative consequences could be avoided. The outcome of carrying out operations without the free, prior, and informed consent of the community is that the community will bear the costs and burden of the mining operations without being able to hold the mining company accountable to mitigate possible harms or violations.


The EIA also serves as a critical tool for integrating broader human rights protections into the mining governance framework. A key process in the EIA is that it includes meaningful consultation with affected communities, including minorities and vulnerable groups, addressing all human rights transparently with the support of an independent expert panel on mitigation and monitoring measures (International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), 2012). Mitigation and monitoring measures can include establishing grievance mechanisms, introducing robust monitoring systems involving regular audits and inspections of mining operations, and implementing community benefit agreements (CBAs) (CNRG, 2024). Community benefit agreements (CBAs) outline the specific commitments to social and economic development, such as infrastructure improvements, employment opportunities, and investment in local services (CNRG, 2024). Taken together, all these aspects of the EIA position community engagement as an important factor for operationalising corporate accountability and ensuring that human rights concerns are continuously considered and addressed throughout the mining operations cycle.


Corporate social responsibility (CSR) operationalises EIA commitments. CSR is increasingly gaining momentum in EIA-related processes as a tool utilized by mining companies to respond to identified social and human rights impacts of mining operations. CSR is often responsive to community concerns in healthcare, education, access to clean drinking water, and enhancements in living conditions, therefore addressing the socio-economic rights of mine-host communities and employees (Musariwa, Rampersad, & Govender, 2023). An example of CSR in Zimbabwe can be found in Zimplats, which is a subsidiary of the South African platinum mining company, Implats. Zimplats has managed to develop a local community by building a Turf town in Mhondoro Ngezi, a model settlement created through mining proceeds, with schools, government offices, banks, and supermarkets using mining proceeds (CNRG, 2024). Another example can be found with the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) Diamond Mine, which is reported to have rolled out social responsibility initiatives by implementing a resettlement and compensation strategy for affected community members of the mine-host community (Musariwa, Rampersad, & Govender, 2023). Conversely, in recent years, some Chinese mining companies have been observed using predatory resource extractive tactics and providing little to no investment in the welfare of their workers and the surrounding communities (CNRG, 2024). More needs to be done to ensure the guidelines established by EIA are followed so meaningful actions are taken, and there is robust implementation of inclusive community participation mechanisms.  


In the private sector, transparency and accountability are linked to CSR, which mainly focuses on community-level charity projects and does not address the root causes of community challenges (Moldalieva, 2021). In Zimbabwe, voluntary CSR has often reduced community development to charitable acts rather than a rights-based entitlement for the community (Moyo & Mabhena, 2014). This is evident in the unfulfilled commitments by Chinese mining companies, like Sinomine Resource Group Co, which conduct lithium mining projects in Bikita, Zimbabwe. They have made promises to contribute towards infrastructure, power, and social development programs, but the company has not delivered on these commitments (Grand, 2024). Fortunately, the Mines and Minerals Bill of 2025 shifted the voluntary framework of CSR to a mandatory mechanism. CSR is set as an agreed minimum standard, which directly benefits the affected communities for strategic minerals and creates environmental restoration funds. These are funds meant for the restoration of the environment in the case of damage. The Bill making CSR mandatory prevents mining companies from ignoring community needs and acts as a safeguard against the potential mining-related harm to communities. 


Lessons from Botswana


Botswana serves as a point of comparison to Zimbabwe, and perhaps as a form of inspiration, given Botswana’s sustainable utilization of resources. Beginning in 1967, Botswana began to use revenue from diamond mining to fund infrastructure, education, health, and other developmental programs (Bryan & Hofmann, 2007). Unlike Zimbabwe, which yields a certain amount of leverage to international mining companies, Botswana’s government is a large shareholder in the profits of diamonds mined by private entities for the purpose of increasing oversight (Bryan & Hofmann, 2007). This arrangement between the public and private sectors yields a balance of profits and community benefits. The contrast between Zimbabwe’s detrimental mineral exploitation experience and Botswana’s more sustainable diamond management shows that when governments are proactive in mineral resource management, they can boost oversight and align corporate objectives with public interests, especially human rights-related interests (Bryan & Hofmann, 2007). Botswana’s legal framework strengthens governmental oversight by enabling the government to participate directly in corporate governance and decision-making processes, which limits noncompliance and improves accountability. Such a framework in Zimbabwe could allow for the mining companies’ business objectives to align with community priorities, benefiting all parties.       


To ensure positive socio-economic outcomes, the government of Botswana has devised a strategy to earmark mining revenue for national development rather than general administrative spending (IDEA, 2024). This is a revenue management strategy run through the Bank of Botswana, named the Pula Fund, a long-term investment portfolio, and Botswana’s sovereign wealth fund. Established in 1994, the Pula Fund was created to preserve part of the income generated from diamond extraction and exports for future generations (IDEA, 2024). Botswana has asserted mineral sovereignty and established long-term fiscal planning with the intent of translating resource extraction into intergenerational equity and broad-based development. Botswana’s “diamond for development” model has been commended, but there has been some criticism about corporate accountability mechanisms. Some say there is a lack of Parliamentary oversight and limited local community participation (IDEA, 2024). This criticism underscores the contingency of the developmental potential of mineral wealth on strategic state participation and accountable revenue management. Nonetheless, the key achievement of Botswana’s mineral resource governance is its ability to commit and institutionalise corporate accountability through government equity participation and regulatory oversight, thereby prioritising broader positive socio-economic outcomes over profit maximisation. 


Villagers demonstrate against a Chinese company in Domboshava, Zimbabwe, on May 6, 2019. (Courtesy Columbus Mavhunga in Zimbabwe Situation)
Villagers demonstrate against a Chinese company in Domboshava, Zimbabwe, on May 6, 2019. (Courtesy Columbus Mavhunga in Zimbabwe Situation)

Corporate Accountability: The Pathway to Community Development and Human Rights Protections 


Mineral resources are important in Zimbabwe because they hold the potential to foster socio-economic development. Minerals such as gold contribute to foreign currency generation and national revenue through artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) and large-scale production, boosting export earnings, employment, government revenue through royalties, and infrastructure development (Moyo, 2020b; National Development Strategy 2 (NDS2) (2025)). The National Development Strategy 2 shows that mining and quarrying contributed to 14.5% of Zimbabwe’s overall GDP in 2025 (National Development Strategy 2 (NDS2) (2025)). Apart from the aforementioned 14.5% GDP contribution, mining contributes an estimate of 53% to exports, 12% to fiscal revenue, 50% of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and creates approximately 35,000 formal jobs (TIZ, n.d). However, the extent to which these revenues can be utilized to foster socio-economic development and advance socio-economic rights, such as environmental rights, property rights, rights to clean water, food, and adequate standards of living, is undetermined. Mine-host communities depend on more than the extraction of minerals and the collection of revenue, but on a mining regulatory framework that strengthens corporate accountability. There is an urgent need for a legal and regulatory framework that will institutionalise important practices such as transparent revenue management, meaningful community engagement & involvement, environmental regulatory compliance, and a grievance redress mechanism for rights violations. 


Zimbabwe’s mining sector legal and regulatory framework has recorded a few developments, which are aimed at establishing the afore-mentioned corporate accountability practices. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development released General Notice 01 of 2025, signalling the transition to a Computerised Mining Cadastre Information Management System (CMCIMS), a nationwide digital registry of all mining titles and operations. This system is praised for its potential in strengthening transparency by enabling better regulatory oversight and environmental monitoring. This is commendable because the cadastre register is a public record of mineral rights, licensing, and contracts that enables communities to participate with all pertinent information. However, the efforts in establishing and implementing the cadastre register have faced some hurdles, including a lack of financing and a delay in roll-out, which have undermined its objectives in curbing corruption, enhancing transparency, and promoting stakeholder engagement. The Zimbabwe Environmental Law Organisation (ZELO) posits that responsible mining practices that establish transparency in Zimbabwe, such as the computerised mining cadastre system and community benefit frameworks introduced in the Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill (2025), do not work in isolation and that the Bill should go further to strengthen compensation and grievance-handling provisions.  The ZELO argues that the mining legal framework is in dire need of both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to address the persistent human rights violations in mine-host communities, emphasising that accessing remedies to grievances is a human rights concern. If reinforced, these transparency and accountability practices could significantly strengthen corporate accountability by ensuring that mining revenues are managed transparently, improving public oversight of mining operations, enhancing community participation in resource governance, and providing access to grievance-handling measures for human rights violations.


Another crucial practice in enhancing corporate accountability is through rigorous government and civil society organisation oversight. (Moldalieva, 2021). Effective localised monitoring can enhance transparency and regulatory compliance within the extractive sector, thereby minimising the resource curse effects arising from revenue leakages, illicit financial flows, and elite capture of mineral wealth, which are essential components of effective local revenue generation and management, formerly referred to as domestic resource mobilisation. Weak corporate accountability measures have the potential to concentrate resource wealth among elites, and the mining companies deepen socio-economic inequalities in affected communities. Bridging the gap between corporate accountability and community inclusion in mining operations requires a sturdy shift towards domestic resource mobilisation. This is where a state can retain and harness its own mineral wealth by stopping corporate revenue leakages and enhancing inclusive community oversight to target socio-economic challenges in mine-host communities.


Domestic resource mobilisation is defined as the fiscal and financial accruals that are generated within a domestic economy (Moyo G, 2020b). According to USAID, domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) can be defined as a process of sustainable development financing, through which countries raise and spend their own funds to provide for their people (USAID, 2016). In the extractive sector, revenue is primarily derived from sources including commissions on natural resources, royalties, fees, rents, penalties, licences, fines, and the sale of goods and services. All of these are critical instruments through which the Zimbabwean government retains financial value from mineral exploitation. The Zimbabwean government can transform mineral resource wealth into sustainable revenue streams, thereby feeding into domestic resource mobilisation. This is done through imposing royalties or taxes, which generate revenue. They strengthen fiscal autonomy as mining revenues can be used to fund governmental programs. The utilisation of mining revenues improves social services, infrastructure, and development priorities (Moyo, 2020b).  Scholars contend that domestic resource mobilisation has the potential to decolonise control over Zimbabwe’s economy by reducing Zimbabwe’s dependence on debt financing from international or multilateral institutions, like the World Bank Group or the African Development Bank (Moyo, 2019). Furthermore, domestic resource mobilisation avails sufficient resources to address persistent socio-economic challenges, including poverty, infrastructure gaps, and limited public services.  Domestic resource mobilisation strengthens democratic engagement between ordinary citizens and governmental institutions, and it facilitates the culture and practice of transparency and accountability in public spending (Moyo G. 2020b). More importantly, with respect to corporate accountability, domestic resource mobilisation fosters a form of social contract between citizens and the government. This happens by strengthening state-citizen reciprocity, whereby income generated through public revenue is reinvested into public goods and the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights.


A corporate accountability framework that strengthens domestic resource mobilization and advances the protection and fulfilment of human rights must be founded on mining best practices that seek to bolster accountability and respect for human rights. Global instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) emphasize that mining practices should be regulated by a framework that defines and implements transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights as essential components of responsible resource governance (Olawuyi, 2018). An adoption of these frameworks would ensure that Zimbabwe’s mining framework addresses governance gaps that result in environmental harm, revenue leakages, and the exclusion of mine-host communities in mineral governance processes. The UNGPs are particularly of interest in this discussion because they establish a corporate responsibility, applicable to mining corporations, to adopt human rights due diligence—requiring mining corporations to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for actual or potential human rights impacts arising from their operations (Buhmann, 2023).   Moreover, human rights due diligence can be conceptually grounded in the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).²  The international framework complements the ACHPR by integrating human rights into business operations and ensuring that mining companies do not just refrain from violating human rights of mine-host communities, but that it actively supports community wellbeing and development.


Conclusion and Recommendations


Zimbabwe’s mining sector is dominated by transnational companies, which mine for valuable resources often at the expense of the local community. Transparency and accountability are crucial to address the needs of these mine-host communities and to foster a more balanced relationship between the private companies and the Zimbabwean government. Strengthened accountability frameworks increase the chances of economic growth, safeguard Zimbabwe’s credibility in the supply chain, and advance the country’s development. The following recommendations aim to bridge the gap between internationally recognised standards and local realities in Zimbabwe.        


  1. Make human rights due diligence legally mandatory. The legal framework in Zimbabwe should require companies, including transnational companies, to conduct human rights due diligence (HRDD). The framework should include continuous risk assessments, mitigation plans, and reporting obligations. To ensure that the processes are inclusive, continuous consultations with community members and local authorities must be ensured to monitor progress and to hold companies accountable.


  2. Adoption of International Standards. Zimbabwe should show commitment to transparency and accountability in the mineral extractive industry by adopting and aligning the existing legal framework with international standards and guidelines such as the EITI and the UNGPs. These frameworks promote responsible mining practices such as respect for human rights, environmental protection, and community engagement.


  3. Independent Monitoring & Oversight. Corporate accountability enables public scrutiny through independent body monitoring and oversight. There is a need to establish independent bodies or regulators comprised of key players, including human rights experts, to monitor compliance. They must establish environmental, social, and human rights standards. Responsible mining in Zimbabwe requires a multisectoral governance framework involving the Ministry of Mines, environmental regulators, human rights institutions, revenue authorities, civil society organizations, local communities, and international partners. 


  4. Stakeholder Dialogue and Participation. Establish permanent multi-stakeholder platforms for meaningful engagement. This can involve government agencies, civil society organisations, human rights organisations, independent institutions, mining companies, artisanal miners, and local communities. This is instrumental in enhancing public participation in mining governance, inclusive policy-making, and corporate accountability.


  5. Transparency & Disclosure Requirements. The legal and policy framework should regulate the disclosure of crucial information related to mining projects. Disclosure of pertinent information is important to empower communities and other stakeholders to take charge of their own development. Free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) relies on the disclosure of mining contracts, community benefit agreements, impact assessment reports, and mitigation plans being made public.


  6. Grievance & Remedy Mechanisms. Companies must be legally mandated to provide accessible grievance channels for communities and workers. The established channels should provide remedies that are enforceable. They should respond to all community concerns, employee grievances, and actual or potential human rights risks.


Footnotes


¹ The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, entrenches the right to administrative justice (sec 68), access to information (sec 62), property rights (sec 71), environmental rights (sec 73), freedom from arbitrary eviction  (sec 74), right to food and water (sec 77).

² Articles 21 and 22 of the African Charter guarantee the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources, and the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. Resolution on the Recognition and Protection of the Right of Participation, Governance and Use of Natural Resources by Indigenous and Local Populations in Africa - ACHPR/Res. 489 (LXIX)2021https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/489-resolution-recognition-and-protection-right-participation-gove 


Glossary


  • Artisanal miners (ASM): small-scale miners who conduct mineral extraction using rudimentary or semi-mechanised methods, often within informal or poorly regulated mining environments.

  • Benefit-sharing: the fair and equitable distribution of the economic, social, and environmental benefits derived from a project

  • Community benefit agreements: an undertaking made between a mining company and a community committing to providing certain benefits such as compensation, skill development, jobs, infrastructure development, and partnerships. 

  • Corporate accountability: the framework that requires companies to account for their decisions and to disclose certain material information.

  • Corporate social responsibility: actions whereby enterprises integrate societal concerns into their business policies and operations, including environmental, economic, and social concerns.

  • Cumulative impact: the combined effect of mining projects in a given area and how they impact the environment, people’s livelihoods, and human rights.

  • Human rights: fundamental entitlements inherent to all human beings. 

  • Human rights-based approach: the integration of human rights principles (respect, fulfil, and protect) into policies, projects, or decisions.

  • Human rights due diligence (HRDD): a process of building internal awareness and understanding of where a company’s activities may have the potential to intersect with human rights or infringe upon the enjoyment of human rights by others. It looks at how to prevent or mitigate potential human rights impacts and remediate actual impacts that have occurred.

  • Meaningful consultation/participation: the engagement with communities in a manner that is inclusive, genuine, transparent, and impactful. It involves availing material information to communities and other stakeholders, providing channels to receive feedback, and incorporating it into decision-making, inclusive of marginalised groups.

  • Minorities and marginalised groups: indigenous peoples, women & girls, children & youth, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and ethnic minorities

  • Multi-sectoral approach: a coordinated collaboration among various stakeholders and sectors to jointly achieve a policy outcome.

  • Post-hoc consultations: stakeholder engagement, public hearings, or negotiations that take place after key decisions have already been made, rather than during the early planning or scoping phases.

  • Responsible mining: the mining practices that prioritise minimising harm to people and the environment, while maximising benefits for the communities and contributing to sustainable development.

  • Soft law: a rule, guideline, or standard that is not legally binding, but still influences how states, organisations, or corporations operate.

  • Stakeholder: an individual, community, group, or organisation with an interest in the outcome of the project, including both those who are affected by it (positively or negatively) and those who can influence it (in a positive or negative way). In the context of mining, this may include governmental agencies and mining companies. Communities, labour force, and NGOs.

  • Stakeholder engagement: the process of identifying, consulting, involving, and communicating with individuals or groups who are affected by, or have an interest in, a project, policy, or decision.

  • Turf town: a settlement developed by a mining company through mining proceeds, consisting of residential, commercial, and public service infrastructure established to support mining operations and surrounding communities.


References


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  22. Sivangani, M. L. (2026, March). Christmas Pass Under Siege: Mutare Speaks Out. Retrieved from CNRG: https://cnrgzim.org/news/christmas-pass-under-siege-mutare-speaks-out/ 

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