The Limits of International Protection for Rohingya

Author: Mahika Datta

October 21, 2026

Thousands of Rohingya have been displaced to refugee camps [Image Credit: Seyyed Mahmoud Hosseini/Wikimedia Commons]

Background: Statelessness and Persecution

Described as one of the most persecuted minorities of the world, the Rohingya people are a stateless, predominantly Muslim, ethnic group from Myanmar's Rakhine State that have been displaced due to years of persecution and denied citizenship (Amnesty International, 2017a). More than 1 million Rohingya have been displaced across 33+ camps, with a majority of the population living in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar region. A further 33,000 refugees are living on Bhasan Char, an isolated location on the Bay of Bengal, and more than 4 million people have been internally displaced within Myanmar (UNHCR, 2026). Nearly 10 years after the “breaking point” of the crisis with a mass exodus in 2017, Rohingya refugees continue to occupy crowded camps, living in poor conditions as stateless refugees with no place to return to, no place to truly call home. 

Myanmar’s Citizenship Law: How it Excludes the Rohingya

Despite generations of residence in Myanmar, the Rohingya people have faced constant systematic discrimination as Myanmar’s government refuses to recognize them as one of the country’s official ethnic groups, instead labeling them as “illegal immigrants” and foreign nationals, preventing them from claiming birthright citizenship (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). The root cause of the discrimination comes down to one legal framework: Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law. Under this law, Myanmar formally recognizes three groups as citizens: members of official “national races,” individuals who had applied for citizenship under the previous 1948 Union Citizenship Law, and naturalized citizens (International Commission of Jurists, 2019). This law essentially restricts citizenship to ethnicity based on what is known as “the List of 135,” which recognizes ethnic groups that meet the three national race criteria mentioned above but excludes hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from formal recognition. However, the Citizenship Law does allow individuals who are not part of the 135 ethnic groups to apply for lower-tier “naturalized” citizenship given that they can prove evidence of ancestry in Burma prior to 1948 (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). Even with this provision, the Rohingya are disadvantaged as the standard is difficult to accomplish due to consistent persecution, military operations, and state-sanctioned violence since the 1970s that stripped them of documentation and public records. Myanmar’s strict citizenship framework shows how the government has institutionalized statelessness and leaves the Rohingya without legal recognition or the basic protections that citizenship provides. 

Restricted Rights

Through what Amnesty International describes as a “dehumanizing apartheid regime”, the Rohingya people have been subject to state-sponsored and institutionalized discrimination over decades (Amnesty International, 2017b). Authorities have restricted many aspects of Rohingya lives from healthcare to housing to education and movement. Rohingya essentially exist in what amounts to “ghettos,” with poor living conditions where they struggle to access basic necessities and are cut off from nearly all key aspects of livelihood. Amnesty International further describes the countless human rights violations and consistent oppression as “a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing.” Rohingya are restricted in travel, with their freedom of movement denied, leading to them being sealed off from the outside of the country and confined to their small villages as per local orders and policies that require special, unavoidable permissions to travel. Even if granted permission, there are checkpoints where people are harassed, assaulted, or arbitrarily denied without reason (Amnesty International, 2017b). Furthermore, Rohingya are denied access to healthcare and medical facilities, with the Sittwe hospital refusing to accept patients of the ethnic group. The few medical facilities that are accessible are left in poor conditions and are severely undersupplied. Children aren’t allowed basic schooling, meaning that the future of Rohingya are restricted due to the lack of education. Rohingya children aren’t allowed to attend government schools within the Rakhine State. Similarly, religion is restricted, with mosques shut down, and the right to assemble is being restricted with bans on public gatherings of more than four people (Amnesty International, 2017b). So without healthcare, education, religion, schooling, housing and more - the Rohingya are living as half of a people, with nearly all of their well-being and livelihood minimized to basic necessities. 

A History of Persecution

The Rohingya have a long history of being persecuted by Myanmar’s government. Since 1977, the Rohingya have been trapped in this cycle of persecution, violence, discrimination, and forced displacement. Through waves of displacement, Rohingya are constantly forced out of their homes and denied basic rights. After the 1989 uprising, a military crackdown by the Myanmar government subjected hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to relocation, execution, and torture. From 1991 to 2016, Rohingya had to live in terrible conditions, suffering from malnutrition and poor living conditions. In October 2016, Rohingya militants attacked border police in Myanmar's Rakhine State, triggering retaliatory action and forcing a new wave of refugees (Doctors Without Borders, 2022). From that came the “breaking point": in 2017, a mass exodus occurred where a military crackdown with fires, rape, murder, severe destruction, and violence forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee. In 2017 alone, there were more than 6,700 violent deaths according to Doctors Without Borders. 700,000 ethnic Rohingya had to seek safety in Bangladesh after the targeted attack (Doctors Without Borders, 2022). By 2022, nearly 1 million Rohingya were living in the small shelters in Cox’s Bazar, relying on very little received aid. As of 2025, Cox’s Bazar hosts over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees. This history shows that for the Rohingya, persecution has not been an isolated event; it has been a continuous cycle that has left thousands of people without a home or rights (Doctors Without Borders, 2022). 

Progress of International Bodies Regarding the Crisis

Humanitarian Response: UNHCR and the Joint Response Plan

In a collaboration between the United Nations and the Government of Bangladesh, the 2025-26 Joint Response Plan (JRP) was launched in March 2025 with the intention of addressing the needs of the Rohingya refugees and aiding the refugee camps, particularly those in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Cha. The initiative involved a plan to gain $934.5 million in 2025 to assist 1.48 million people (Bangladesh Operational Data Portal, 2025). Based on 3 fundamental pillars - working towards repatriation of the Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, securing the identity of the Rohingya, and promoting a peaceful and safe environment for Rohingya refugees - the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been working to target key security areas including food security, protection, water, sanitation, health, shelter, education, nutrition, and livelihoods (Bangladesh Operational Data Portal, 2025). 

While the JRP has been working since 2025, it continues to face limitations due to underfunding, legal restrictions, and restricted local integration. The UNHCR lacks the power to grant formal legal status as this plan is primarily focused on aid, so they are unable to help gain permanent rights for Rohingya under Myanmar’s restrictive government policies. Similarly, they can not ensure a safe return to Myanmar when there is active conflict and continuing systemic persecution in the region. Furthermore, the JRP operates strictly as an emergency relief and aid framework, it is unable to fund long-term development.  Additionally, financial appeals continue to be scaled down due to a lack of funding power, and this restricts the amount of aid the plan can send out, resulting in coverage of only some lifesaving needs, often excluding support and services like education and gender-based protection. Ultimately, while the JRP does provide aid and essential humanitarian relief, it isn’t sustainable in addressing all needs and fully restoring the Rohingya people’s livelihoods.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in International Law

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is a foundational international norm that ensures that the international community works together to prevent mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Global Centre for The Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). Despite the countless human rights violations, persecution, and war crimes in Myanmar against the Rohingya, the R2P has not been formally invoked and the UN Security Council (UNSC) has yet to respond to the crimes. In September 2017, the UNSC was briefed on the developments in Myanmar regarding the crisis and the UNSC members were made aware of the worsening conditions, yet no initiative was launched (Güneş Gülal et al., 2021). Although the UNSC did call upon the government of Myanmar to stop using military power in the Rakhine state, no change occurred, despite the acknowledgement of it being a “crime against humanity” and an “ethnic cleansing.” The international community, in a fragmented manner, with different nations contributing to different sanctions, responded to the atrocity crimes by providing economic and political sanctions regarding aid, arrests, and support from food aid to punishing military officials (Güneş Gülal et al., 2021). Along with the UNSC, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continuously put pressure on the Myanmar government and military to end the human rights violations against the Rohingya. However, Russia and China, two voting members of the UNSC, countered by asking the international community to lay off the pressure on the Myanmar government (Güneş Gülal et al., 2021). With the UNSC split between an international response and a lack of consequence for the Myanmar government, it has been unable to act in a unified manner to aid the Rohingya. 

Judicial Accountability: International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court

On November 11, 2019, The Gambia filed a case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Myanmar, claiming that the government had failed to fulfill its obligations, as per the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, to prevent and punish the acts of genocide committed against the Rohingya (United Nations, 2019). A few months later, in January of 2020, the ICJ issued a formal order directing Myanmar to “take measures within its power” to prevent the acts of genocide and to submit reports proving compliance with that formal order. Myanmar did object to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, claiming that it was a domestic matter and therefore had no need for international involvement; however, the ICJ refuted that statement under the notion that interference was for the “common interest” of all signatories of the Genocide Convention (United Nations, 2019). Over the course of a few years, The Gambia and Myanmar went back and forth, filing responses to claims, and eventually, in 2023 and 2024, other signatories of the 1948 Convention filed a joint declaration of intervention, pushing for intervention to prevent the genocide of Rohingya. The most recent update regarding this case is that the ICJ began deliberating in January of 2026, with judgement expected as early as October 2026’ (RK News Desk, 2026;  United Nations, n.d). 

Parallel to the ICJ’s efforts of intervention within the crisis, the International Criminal Court (ICC) judges granted the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) request to investigate the crisis in November of 2019 (International Criminal Court, 2024). The ICC was able to claim jurisdiction, despite being an international body, by claiming that at least one element of the alleged crimes had taken place in Bangladesh, who is an ICC member. The ICC allowed Rohingya who were victims of persecution and deportation to testify and address the court through the Victims Participation and Reparations. After investigation, in 2024, the OTP claimed that there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defense Services bore criminal responsibility for the crimes against humanity of the persecution of the Rohingya (International Criminal Court, 2024). 

In addition to the ICJ and ICC, multiple human rights organizations worked with Argentina to file a criminal case under the principle of universal jurisdiction against Myanmar for their crimes against humanity. In 2025, an Argentine court issued arrest warrants for 25 of the individuals involved in these crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2026). Together, these legal efforts have created avenues for accountability, but their limited enforcement power and slow progress demonstrate the challenges in securing  justice for the Rohingya. 

Violations and Broken Laws

Genocide Law

The Genocide Convention defines genocide as certain acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Prohibited acts within this definition include killing, atrocities, deliberately creating conditions of life that work to destroy a group, and more. The Genocide Convention mandates that states have an obligation to “prevent and punish” genocides, and this law is primarily enforced through national courts and international mechanisms like the ICJ (United Nations, 2019). Rohingya civilians have been subjected to mass killings, rape and sexual violence, destruction of home, and deprivation of food, shelter and other necessities. The ICJ specifically identified these acts when considering the rights of the Rohingya under the Genocide Convention. The Rohingya do constitute a protected group as they are an ethnic minority, and the U.S. Secretary of State explicitly labeled the crisis as an “ethnic cleansing” (United Nations, 2019). The ICJ, in The Gambia vs Myanmar, explicitly ordered Myanmar to take all measures within its power to prevent genocidal acts against the Rohingya. 

Refugee Law

Non-refoulement is one of the fundamental principles of refugee law. This principle is most compromised in the Rohingya crisis and remains a key concern of the UNHCR as they work to aid the Rohingya. The principle of non-refoulement says that refugees should not be returned to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened and should be able to return to their country of origin only when the return is “voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). States are required to provide protection to people fleeing persecution and serious human rights violations. While this obligation falls on the states hosting Rohingya refugees, such as Bangladesh, Myanmar’s persistent persecution is what created the conditions that require such protection in the first place, leaving thousands of Rohingya vulnerable and hopeless. The Rohingya have been forcibly displaced from Myanmar, and the conditions that have caused such displacement have not been adequately resolved. Thus, forced or premature return to Myanmar could expose Rohingya to more persecution. 

This concern was especially evident during the 2018 and 2019 repatriation attempts. In 2018, there was an attempt to return 2,260 Rohingya to Myanmar;; however, it failed as refugees refused to leave without “guarantees for their safety and rights.” The following year, in August of 2019, 3,450 Rohingya were cleared for return to Myanmar, yet none of the 235 heads of households interviewed by the UNHCR were willing to return. Rohingya refugees were hesitant and concerned with the repatriation process, and eventually, the Bangladesh Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner emphasized that “no forced repatriation would take place” (European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2019). Antje Missbach, a professor of global and transnational migration at Bielefeld University, also noted that Myanmar has not offered the Rohingya citizenship and that many Rohingya villages have been destroyed or occupied by other communities, stating that “Rakhine is not safe” (Hutt, 2026). Essentially, this law is compromised because any attempt to return Rohingya to Myanmar would raise a non-refoulement concern as there is no way to ensure the return is “voluntary, safe, dignified, or sustainable.”

International Human Rights Law

There are several aspects of international human rights law that are implicated in this crisis, with three key treaties applying to the situation: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 

The ICCPR protects the right to life, freedom from torture and cruel treatment, liberty, security, protection from arbitrary detention, freedom of movement, and protection against discrimination (United Nations, 1966a). While Bangladesh has ratified this treaty, Myanmar hasn’t, leaving gaps in jurisdiction. Myanmar has, however, violated many of these protections, with Rohingya being subject to arrests, being restricted in travel, and being discriminated against based on ethnicity. 

The ICESCR protects the rights to work, to have just and favorable working conditions, an adequate standard of living, the highest attainable standard of health, education, and such (United Nations, 1966b). Both Bangladesh and Myanmar ratified this treaty, and Myanmar has violated it by denying access to education, work, and healthcare. The Rohingya live in poor living conditions and are not afforded necessities for development like education and work. 

The CRC, which protects children from discrimination, protects the right to life, name and nationality, humanitarian assistance, health, and education is also violated by Myanmar in their actions against the Rohingya (United Nations, 1989). Both Bangladesh and Myanmar have ratified this, yet Myanmar has denied a fundamental protection outlined by this treaty: birthright citizenship. Furthermore, around half of the displaced population include children and they are left with little aid and no access to food, healthcare, education, or safety. 

For the Rohingya, these gaps in their protection mean that their basic rights remain vulnerable and there is no secure future unless those gaps are closed and addressed. 

Why Protection Keeps Failing: An Analysis

Statelessness

Statelessness undercuts every other protection as having no state means less formal recognition, which equates to less protection. A state’s obligation is to provide primary legal and political protection for individuals (UNHCR, 2025a). Thus, stateless people lack the protection normally associated with citizenship. The Rohingya, being recognized only as a stateless group and even classified as “illegal immigrants”, have been excluded from domestic protection. Because of this lack of citizenship, they have been more vulnerable to restrictions and violations, and their statelessness essentially creates a gap where the lack of recognized legal status makes it harder for Rohingya to claim and enforce protections. 

Bangladesh’s Non-Signatory Status to Refugee Convention

Bangladesh is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and it lacks a comprehensive national refugee/asylum framework (Naureen Rahim, 2023). So while the Rohingya are receiving aid in Bangladesh, their safety is not guaranteed as their treatment is heavily dependent on the country’s domestic policies and ad hoc arrangements. Even with the aid Bangladesh is offering, the refugees are in a situation where they are only provided limited, temporary solutions. 

UNSC’s Veto Structure and Lack of Enforcement

The UNSC is the body that is primarily responsible for international peace and security and the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, U.K. and the U.S.) possess veto power. In order to be issued, a UNSC resolution requires no negative vote from a permanent member (Security Council Report, 2024). The UNSC’s enforcement capacity is heavily constrained when geopolitical interests of the members may conflict within humanitarian protection. The UNSC has repeatedly split over draft resolutions between intervention and non-intervention because of the military relationships between China, Russia, and Myanmar (United Nations, 2019). With China and Russia countering the draft resolution pushing for intervention in Myanmar, the UNSC has struggled to take substantive action to mitigate the crisis. 

Sovereignty Norms Constraining Intervention

Sovereignty refers to how states have authority over their own domestic affairs and are protected from outside interference. Myanmar has used this international relations principle to challenge the legitimacy and jurisdiction of international scrutiny of its conduct regarding the persecution of Rohingya. International institutions, because of the principle of sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention, can’t override state sovereignty without a recognized legal basis. In ICJ’s The Gambia vs Myanmar case, the court had to establish jurisdiction by appealing to the interest of the community to counter Myanmar’s argument of sovereignty and domestic relations (United Nations, 2019). So while international institutions can document violations, they often lack the ability to enforce compliance, creating a gap between international recognition and actual substantive intervention. 

International Justice Takes Time

Referring back to the timeline of the ICJ’s The Gambia vs Myanmar case, the process of recognition, intervention, and accountability can take years. The persecution of Rohingya has been going on since the 1970s, and only after the 2017 mass exodus and the international legal action that followed in 2019 did it truly gain salience in international human rights crises. International courts and accountability mechanisms require investigation, evidence, filing, proceedings, hearing, judgements, and more. So while there is an ongoing case in the ICJ regarding the Rohingya and Myanmar, deliberation only recently started in January of 2026 and there is no telling when and what happens next in terms of justice for the Rohingya (United Nations, 2019). While the legal system can and will most likely eventually establish responsibility, it won’t ensure protection for the Rohingya now. 

A Protracted Crisis: Funding Shortfalls and Competing Crises

Although the JRP with the UN is in action, it’s faced dwindling financial resources and is coming short of reaching its goal to help attain food, security, healthcare, shelter, education, etc. Livelihood funding gaps continue to limit the ability of refugees to meet basic needs, and current funding can only support so much. For instance, only 20% of gender-based violence interventions, 37% of child protection activities, and 13% of education programs have been funded (Bangladesh Operational Data Portal, 2025). Insufficient funding limits the ability of humanitarian aid organizations and programs to substantiate formal protection commitments into actual protection, and in this case, the funding can only help with the bare minimum standard of living and not as much of long-term development needs. 

Furthermore, international attention isn’t abundant, and every resource can’t go everywhere. Today, international organizations and governments are responding to crises in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, and more. The UN’s 2025 Rohingya appeal linked the decline in available resources to “competing global crises” (UNHCR, 2025b). The situation with the Rohingya crisis is nothing short of a protracted displacement crisis where thousands of Rohingya have been refugees for years and there isn’t a promise of a safe return home to Myanmar. 

Conclusion: The Gap Between Law and Enforcement

While international law can grant rights and establish protections, without effective enforcement, these protections hold little value. Despite the continuous efforts of the UN, international courts, and human rights organizations to address and aid the crisis, the Rohingya people are still stateless, persecuted, displaced, and have limited access to basic rights and adequate living conditions. The gap between the protections promised by international frameworks and the lived experiences of the Rohingya people stems from the lack of enforcement and insufficient funding. Thus, closing this gap requires stronger international accountability, humanitarian support, as well as substantive pressure on Myanmar’s government to restore Rohingya’s rights. Until these changes occur, the Rohingya will remain stateless and will have limited access to the thing they need most: a place to call home. 

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Glossary

• Ad hoc - refers to something created for a single, one-time purpose to address scope-specific issues

• Apartheid - a policy of segregation and political, social, and economic discrimination

• Cox's Bazar - a district in Bangladesh that hosts the Kutapalong refugee camp, which is the largest and most densely populated refugee settlement in the world, sheltering more than 1 million Rohingya

• Crimes against humanity - specific crimes committed that are large-scale and targeted towards civilians, including torture, murder, sexual violence, enslavement, persecution, etc. 

• Displacement - a situation where people are forced to leave where they normally live

• Ethnic cleansing -  the systematic and forced removal of a specific ethnic group from a territory

• Exodus -  a mass departure of a group of people from a place

• Genocide - acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group

• Institutionalized discrimination - the inequitable treatment of a group resulting from practices that are incorporated in social, political, or economic institutions

• Myanmar - a country in Southeast Asia

• Non-refoulement - a core principle of international law that bans countries from returning any person to a place where they could face persecution

• Persecution - unfair treatment over a long period of time because of race, religion, or political beliefs

• Principle of sovereignty - a principle that regulates interstate relations saying that a state possesses independent authority over their specific territory, free from external influence 

• Principle of universal jurisdiction - a principle that allows any country to prosecute individuals for severe international crimes

• Protracted crisis - a prolonged, continuous emergency where a portion of the population faces risk to basic livelihood due to long-lasting instability

• Rakhine State - a division located on the western coast of Myanmar where the Rakhine people live and where many Rohingya live. 

• Repatriation - the act of returning a person back to their country of origin or citizenship

• Rohingya - a stateless ethnic minority group from the Rakhine State of Myanmar

• Rule of non-intervention - a principle that prohibits states and international bodies from interfering in the affairs of other sovereign nations. 

• Responsibility to protect - a global political commitment to protect and prevent mass atrocities

• Sovereignty - the autonomy of a state to govern itself

• Statelessness - the condition of being a person who does not have the nationality or citizenship of any country

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