The Illusion of Democracy: Studying Electoral Authoritarianism in Rwanda

Author: Trisha Sayal

February 4, 2026

Introduction

Democracy seems to be dying a slow death.

Particularly, wealthy countries are experiencing unprecedented tyranny and dictatorship, not through violent military takeovers but in an overreach of incumbent, formerly democratic leaders (Riedl et al., 2025, p. 163). What is occurring globally can be described as the erosion of democracy and the rise of electoral authoritarianism, which refers to the exploitation of democratic systems and institutions by regimes and political actors, presenting an “illusion” of a multi-party democracy by holding frequent, but unfair elections, to maintain or increase their power and influence (Tlemçani, 2007).

During the 2024 Presidential Election, Rwandan incumbent President Paul Kagame garnered over 99% of the national vote, with a record-shattering 98% national turnout, reported Danai Nesta Kupemba of BBC News (Kupemba, 2024). These numbers are even more staggering when contrasted against the global trend, as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance states that international voter turnout has been on the decline since the 1990s (Solijonov, 2016, p. 8). 

Such a high amount of certainty among the vast majority of the Rwandan population stands out especially amidst the growing global anti-incumbency wave that has displaced many sitting African governments. In the same year that Rwanda held unfair and inequitable elections, the governments of Senegal, Botswana, Mauritius, Somaliland, and Ghana observed peaceful transitions of power according to the Nordic Africa Institute (Bob-Milliar, 2025). Therefore, the re-election of Kagame sticks out as not only unusual, but suspicious in a global context.

This article seeks to examine the 2024 Rwandan Presidential Election and Rwandan governmental structure under President Paul Kagame as a textbook example of democratic erosion and the methodical, slow takeover of autocracy through his elimination of viable opposition candidates, control over the Rwandan media, and constitutional manipulation.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame in military gear. [Image source: The EastAfrican]

Kagame’s Rise to Power and Global Influence

The rise of Paul Kagame, currently the sitting President of Rwanda, can be directly linked to his victory over the Hutu extremists who killed over 800,000 of the Rwandan Tutsi and Hutu moderates during the 100-day 1994 Rwandan genocide (Chibelushi, 2024). During this short time frame, almost 1 million of the Tutsi ethnic minority group in Rwanda were violently slaughtered following accusations of assassinating the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, who belonged to the Hutu ethnic majority group (Chibelushi, 2024). The ethnic genocide against the Tutsi, which was further perpetrated through the use of TV and radio-based propaganda and carried out by the general public, defines the legal and political environment of Rwanda today and is integral to understanding Kagame’s political legitimacy and motives. 

In 1990, Kagame, a Tutsi, became the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF became a movement that marketed itself as inclusive and for all Rwandans, composed primarily of Tutsi soldiers who had initially fled persecution in Rwanda and had hidden out in neighboring Uganda (The Economist, 2021). During the Rwandan Civil War, where the RPF successfully overthrew the sitting Hutu government and ended the genocide, it is alleged that Kagame’s forces committed numerous atrocities, including the murder of multiple Hutu civilians, although they continuously deny these accusations (Chibelushi, 2024). Following the Civil War and the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Kagame’s RPF thus undertook the responsibility of rebuilding Rwanda after taking control of the country in July 1994. 

The genocide of the Tutsi in 1994 and Kagame’s role in ethnicity politics continue to have lasting influence, not only just in Rwanda but in surrounding countries. In the final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo), the United Nations accused the Rwandan government of funding and allying with the M23 rebel group's insurgency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, specifically by sending members of the Rwandan Defense Forces to yield weapons and engage in direct combat in Congo (De Groof et al., 2024, p. 423). Kagame’s alliance with the M23, which broadly exists to fight the looming threat of Tutsi discrimination posed by the presence of génocidaires in Congo, has prolonged instability and war throughout the region (Jean-Jacques, 2025). In this way, not only does allying with M23 prevent the rise of ethnic extremism in the region, but Kagame can prop up Tutsi allies in the region. 

In response, in February 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Rwanda. It halted the flow of bilateral foreign aid to the country due to Rwanda’s support for the M23, leaving the country without the annual $40 million in aid from London (Chibelushi, 2025). This move followed a series of US-led sanctions on Rwanda’s Minister of State for Regional Integration, James Kabarebe (Chibelushi, 2025). The international community thus seems willing to place handcuffs on the Rwandan regime for overstepping into global politics and infringing on another country’s sovereignty, but the question remains whether they can force meaningful change and democratization within Rwanda. 

Institutionalizing Authoritarianism through Elections

The Kagame regime has consistently utilized its control over state institutions to prevent the opposition from forming coalitions or securing positions of power. This method of implementing democratic backsliding, referred to by the Johns Hopkins University Press as executive aggrandizement, relies on the willingness of a majority political party to exercise and manipulate control over democratic institutions, thereby centralizing power within the party (Riedl et al. 2025, p. 163). 

Elections in Rwanda are controlled and conducted through Rwanda’s National Electoral Commission, which prevented three additional candidates from campaigning and running in the 2024 Presidential Election against Kagame (Muia & Bikorimana, 2024). One of the three candidates barred from competition, and the only female candidate, Diane Rwigara, stated that Kagame’s government “cheated” her out of her right to campaign in both the 2017 and 2024 elections due to allegations of a lack of proper documentation regarding her criminal background, birthright citizenship, and claims of forged signatures (Muia & Bikorimana, 2024). She also alleged that her followers were harassed, intimidated, and detained by Kagame’s government officers in an effort to gather signatures during her 2017 campaign (Freedom House, 2018). Interestingly, Rwigara was previously imprisoned on charges of “belittling” the genocide, further signaling how Kagame’s government uses the 1994 genocide to build its legitimate claim to power (Muia & Bikorimana, 2024). In March 2024, opposition figure Victoire Ingabire similarly was banned from participating in the presidential election, also imprisoned on charges of belittling the genocide (Bucyana & Cyuzuzo, 2024). 

Because the effects of the genocide are continuously felt today throughout Rwanda, the current regime’s legitimacy hails from ending the genocide, and it is illegal to discuss ethnicity in Rwanda, these charges against Rwigara and Ingabire carry intense emotion and history (Chibelushi, 2024). They are thus difficult to disprove or challenge without disrupting the ethnic, political, and cultural climates in Rwanda, positioning opposition groups as fundamentally opposed to Rwandan society and allowing Kagame’s regime to disbar potential opponents on unclear legal grounds and justifications. Because individuals who have been jailed for more than six months are not eligible to run in political elections, the judicial system in Rwanda has become an opportunity for Kagame to silence threats to his power (Muia & Bikorimana, 2024).

The systemic silencing of political opponents before they are introduced to the general public creates a political environment in which citizens are unable to cast an educated vote. The current Rwandan regime prioritizes establishing a straightforward, truthful narrative about the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, which further explains why accusations about Rwigara’s attitude toward the genocide are so harmful. In 2001, the RPF implemented the nationwide Gacaca court system, which can be understood as a participatory justice system that looked to institutionalize accountability for those who perpetuated genocide, or génocidaires (United Nations, n.d.). The court system, controversially, examined the genocide charges through the lens of reconciliation, granting lesser sentences to those who admitted to their atrocities and were repentant and remorseful. This framework may be attributed to the fact that many of the genocidal killings were done by neighbors, partners, and family members cohabitating. Because the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups lived in such proximity in Rwanda and were so deeply interconnected, it was important to prevent further division and alienation in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi. Therefore, allegations of genocide denial not only prevent Rwigara from campaigning but also position her as fundamentally incompatible with the Rwandan system. 

The National Election Commission, and thereby the Rwandan government, further exerts power over voters through coercion and manipulation of the voting process. According to Human Rights Watch, Rwandan citizens cite instances of mandatory donations to Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front party and monitored voting by election officials (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Specifically, the mandatory observation of Rwandan citizens as a method of election rigging aims to raise the perceived costs of dissent for voters, providing direct consequences for disobedience. However, this is not to suggest that Kagame’s regime is unwilling to resort to plain election fraud. Freedom House alleges that poll workers partook in ballot stuffing practices and were unwilling to allow observers into the inner-workings of the vote-counting process (Freedom House, 2018). The lack of autonomy granted to Rwandan citizens to choose Kagame as their leader may signal a growing lack of trust and sense of desperation within the regime to maintain power, hinting that dissent may not be as well suppressed as they would like it to be. In this manner, election manipulation seeks to enhance both the regime’s legitimacy on the global stage and its power over the general public.

Kagame’s Media and Constitutional Takeover

Since Kagame’s presidency began, his administration has come to control much of Rwandan media. Reporters Without Borders, a non-governmental organization that protects media assistants and journalists, described Rwandan attitudes toward and the abilities of media personnel to operate independently as among the “poorest in Africa” (Reporters Without Borders, n.d.). Notably, Rwanda's legal framework has failed to protect journalists and independent media, particularly with the purpose of maintaining the regime's reputation and preventing criticism of it. By treating journalists as ‘activists,’ they are characterized as political actors opposing the government rather than serving the people, thereby making them vulnerable to persecution and imprisonment, particularly media members who allegedly defame the president (Reporters Without Borders, n.d.). 

Activists in Rwanda often face intense questioning and are threatened under the power of the regime. Jacques Nkurunziza, a Rwandan-born, current French refugee, is the son of  Théobald Rutihunza, a former member of the Rwandan opposition party Democratic Republican Movement (MDR). Upon his return to Rwanda, according to the Human Rights Watch, he was held without charge and without access to a lawyer, handcuffed, interrogated, and without food or water for an extended period of time (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Horrifyingly, he described that the detention center that was held contained around 150 others in similar holding situations. He was arrested three times and was interrogated about his family and involvements in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi (Human Rights Watch, 2023). This intimidation of the activists who operate in opposition to Kagame’s regime and their families indicates that Rwanda lacks the freedoms of speech and association present in other developed democracies.

President Kagame inspects a guard of honour mounted by the new cadets at Rwanda Military Academy-Gako. [Image source: RT Press]

Rwandan opposition of non-state-controlled media has roots in the 1994 genocide, as the privately-owned Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) was used to circulate anti-Tutsi propaganda and subsequently incited horrific genocidal violence. This antagonization of reporters and journalists in the modern media space, however, has fatal consequences. The Human Rights Watch reports that numerous journalists and opposition members have gone missing under Kagame’s watchful regime due to speaking out about its authoritarian tendencies. Specifically, Eugène Ndereyimana, a journalist and member of the forces démocratiques unifiées (FDU)-Inkingi party, which advocates for regime change in Rwanda, and journalist Constantin Tuyishimire were both reported missing in the summer of 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Currently, 3 journalists are detained in Rwandan prisons (Reporters Without Borders, n.d.).

An attack on Rwandan media demonstrates how Kagame’s regime seeks to control the narrative surrounding his governance. In this manner, criticism of the regime or its actions is viewed not as a way to keep the government accountable, but rather as diminishing the regime’s legitimacy and posing a threat to its control. In democratic countries with independent media and a free media landscape, while people in power may not personally appreciate a reporter’s perspective, they must tolerate it. In Rwanda, reporters must accept and adopt the regime's opinions to continue operating.

Interestingly, Kagame seeks to create a widespread propaganda machine not unlike the one used to perpetuate the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Rwandans were made to attend so-called “solidarity” camps in which they digested RPF and pro-Kagame propaganda (Freedom House, 2018). Freedom House alleges that Kagame’s regime also took care to establish multiple avenues of coercion, in which people were forced to show face at pro-Kagame rallies and faced pressure from local community leaders who had been paid off by authorities to vote for Kagame (Freedom House, 2018). In this manner, Kagame aims to present a sort of united front in which opposing him requires going against friends, family members, neighbors, and one’s identity as a Rwandan.

Another example of electoral authoritarianism in Rwanda is the willingness of Kagame’s regime to reject Rwandan procedural democracy. In 2015, Kagame’s RPF pushed for a referendum to amend the Rwandan constitution and push back presidential term limits, allowing for an extension of Kagame’s power despite international criticism that the vote was conducted without sufficient time for debate on the issues and a lack of independent watchdogs to ensure election credibility (Uwiringiyimana, 2015). This proposal was particularly criticized by the United States, the European Union, and the opposition Democratic Green Party in Rwanda, who noted that they were “not given a chance” to debate and campaign against the referendum, specifically by pushing the vote through quickly and in a hasty manner (Uwiringiyimana, 2015). This move, in the context of Kagame’s need to stay in a position of power, signals a disrespect for the election process. Furthermore, it suggests the Rwandan government is fearful that, if given the proper chance via free public discourse and independently-monitored elections, Rwandans may vote against their will. 

Kagame was emboldened to pursue a chokehold on presidential power by the results of the aforementioned referendum, in which 98.3% of voters accepted an amended constitution that extended his potential stay in office by over 20 years (Uwiringiyimana, 2015). Kagame being eligible to remain president until 2034 removes the opportunity for new individuals, ideas, and proposals to make their way into Rwandan politics, unable to invoke meaningful change in the Rwandan system. Although the results indicate suspiciously high approval and hint at likely voting manipulation, the results of the referendum were used as a means to justify authoritarianism by hiding behind the ideals of democracy and the will of the people. Specifically, by framing a push for more control as “the people’s choice,” Kagame seeks to establish his rational-legal legitimacy as a leader and spokesperson of the Rwandan people. In this way, Kagame manipulated the institutions of Rwandan democracy to further his power. 

Under the pathway of executive aggrandizement, Kagame pursues plebiscitary override, in which parties in power use referendum and populist narratives to “circumvent” institutions that may challenge their power (Riedl et al. 2025, p. 163). Although increasing term limits does not necessarily ensure victory, when coupled with other elements of electoral authoritarianism, any candidate with as much legitimacy, power, and experience as Kagame is likely to use this avenue to pursue an electoral authoritarian regime without a peaceful transfer of power. Regardless of a state's genuine intent to seek and pursue democratic governance, a blatant disregard for democratic rule of law indicates that a regime is no longer concerned with the facade of constitutionalism. Not only did Kagame prevent opposition parties from gaining power, but he also halted the rise of a new political figure within the ruling party.

Conclusion

The regional reaction to Kagame’s 2024 election was overwhelmingly positive, with the neighboring Ugandan authoritarian regime declaring that these numbers indicate a deep-seated "trust" in the Rwandan political system and its government (Kupemba, 2024). Given the uncompetitiveness of Rwanda's electoral system, it is worrying that Rwanda’s neighbors seem to prioritize stability over democracy and that other authoritarian regimes seek to align themselves with Kagame. This attitude is emblematic of a larger regional issue concerning how democracy is implemented and marketed. According to Afrobarometer, a pan-African research network which conducts and collects survey data on democracy, governance, the economy, and society, citizen opposition to democracy is built on a perceived socioeconomic decline regardless of the actual impact (Afrobarometer, 2024). Although many may desire democratic institutions in theory and support for democracy is strong, people will ultimately prioritize a stable quality of life over democracy. 

While this finding may not inspire optimism among proponents of democracy, it is crucial to understanding the position and connotation of democracy in the Global South and why electoral authoritarianism has so firmly cemented itself in the Rwandan government. The International Monetary Fund named Rwanda as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, where the country’s economy saw growth of over 7.2% in 2024 and the first half of 2025, particularly due to the success of coffee exports and the expansion of the service sector (International Monetary Fund, 2025). Rwanda’s success is aided by its ability to diversify the economy beyond the natural resource sector and by providing stability through an authoritarian government that prevents uncertainty and change. Until authoritarianism becomes unprofitable, it is difficult to see a clear path to democracy. 

As the actions of the Kagame regime continue to signal a turn towards electoral authoritarianism, the question becomes what, if anything, external actors can do without reinforcing the regime’s narrative or harming ordinary citizens. It is clear, however, that authoritarianism cannot parade itself as the ‘safe’ option any longer.

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Glossary

• Authoritarianism: A political system characterized by the centralization and concentration of government power, often maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential or supposed challengers by armed force.

• Civil war: Organized war between two or more groups within the same state.

• Decolonization: The process of removing colonial entities and government from a state or region and restoring sovereignty to the colonized peoples.

• Democratic erosion: The incremental decay of democratic institutions, norms, and processes.

• Electoral authoritarianism: The exploitation of democratic systems and institutions by regimes and political actors, presenting an illusion of a multi-party democracy by holding frequent, but unfair elections, to maintain or increase their power and influence

• Election: A formal and organized choice by vote of a person for a political office.

• Emblematic: Symbolic of a concept or idea.

• Executive aggrandizement: A force of democratic erosion that occurs when a democratically-elected leader gradually increases their power by weakening democratic checks and balances.

• Génocidaires: Those who commit acts of genocide.

• Genocide: The deliberate and intentional killing of a specific nation or ethnic group with the intent of destroying that group.

• Global South: Describing countries often characterized by lower per capita income and a history of colonialism.

• Hybrid regime: A political system that combines elements of both democratic and authoritarian governance.

• Indiscriminate: Without a clear target; randomly.

• Leverage: To use an existing resource or situation to maximize one’s own advantage.

• March 23 Movement (M23): A rebel group primarily based in North Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• Manipulate: Handle or control unfairly.

• Pan-Africanism: A political and social ideology that aims to strengthen solidarity between all indigenous peoples and diasporas of Sub-Saharan African ancestry.

• Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s president since 2000; former military leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Forces.

• Perpetuate: Causing or prolonging an event or situation.

• Regime: A system or method of government.

• Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF): The ruling political party in Rwanda; successor to the military wing that won the Rwandan Civil War and ended the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. 

• United Nations: A global peacemaking and security organization with 193 Member States, founded in 1945.

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