Persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang:Torture, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide

Author: Hanh Vu, LLM

January 21, 2026

A protester against China’s harsh repression of Muslim Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or what people there prefer to call East Turkestan, whose unofficial flag is above. [Image credit: ABDUGHENI SABIT/TWITTER]

Introduction

In the past decade, there has been increasing documentation of human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (referred to as “Xinjiang”). Various investigations, by journalists, governments, and independent groups, indicate a coordinated, state-led effort to suppress core aspects of Uyghur identity.

Reported abuses include arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, invasive surveillance, forced labor, state-imposed birth control measures, and family separation. In response, the Uyghur Tribunal investigated and reviewed evidence to assess whether Chinese actions meet legal standards for torture, crimes against humanity, and genocide under international law.

This article outlines the Tribunal’s findings and its application of international law in assessing whether documented abuses constitute torture, crimes against humanity, or genocide. The following sections provide essential background on Xinjiang and the Uyghur communities to contextualize these findings.

Background

China is the largest country in East Asia.  It has a population of approximately 1.4 billion, of whom 91% are Han Chinese.  Uyghurs are among the largest of 56 officially recognized ethnic groups. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leads the political system. Administratively, China is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, and special administrative regions.¹

Xinjiang is China’s largest autonomous region. It has a population of approximately 25.85 million and is rich in resources. It borders eight countries and connects China to Central Asian markets and beyond. Its residents include Han Chinese, Uyghurs, and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities.²

Uyghurs are a Turkic-speaking Sunni Muslim group. There are approximately 11.5 million in China, mainly in Xinjiang. Historically, Uyghurs were the vast majority but now comprise roughly 40% of the region's population. Many Uyghurs call the region East Turkestan (Sherqi Turkistan).³

Historical Overview

Uyghur history traces back to the Karabalghasan, an early Uyghur empire in what is now Mongolia.  In 840 CE, Kyrgyz tribes conquered the empire. Subsequent centuries saw shifting powers among Uyghur, Mongol, and Han-led states. By the 13^th century, Mongol rule extended across what is now Xinjiang. The Manchu Qing Empire consolidated control in Xinjiang in the mid-18^th century, lost it after 1864, and regained it by 1878.⁴

After the Qing collapsed in 1911, the emerging Republic of China had limited control in Xinjiang. In the 1930s, discontent over taxation policies that supported Han settlement sparked several Uyghur uprisings, leading up to the short-lived East Turkestan Republics in 1933 and 1944.  Both republics were later dismantled. Following the Communist takeover, Xinjiang became an autonomous region in 1955, yet most officials were Han, fueling tensions and resentment.⁵

The Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) caused significant hardship for Uyghurs and prompted tens of thousands (between 60,000 and 100,000) of Uyghur and Kazakhs to flee China. The 1980s saw unrest tied to Han migration. In 1990, a mosque closure led to the Baren Township uprising, with at least 50 dead.  More violence followed through the decade, with the 1997 bombings and attacks in both Xinjiang and Beijing, attributed to Uyghur extremists.⁶

Major unrest erupted in Urumqi in 2009, leading the then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to seek an independent investigation. The Chinese government reported and attributed thousands of attacks in Xinjiang, from 1990 to 2016, to terrorist, separatist, and extremist groups. They also characterized several violent incidents outside of Xinjiang as acts of terrorism.  Simultaneously, reports of some Uyghurs joining armed groups abroad, including Afghanistan and Syria, heightened domestic and international concerns. In 2014, Beijing began the “Strike Hard” campaign, framing it as a counterterrorism initiative within Xinjiang.⁷

The Uyghur Tribunal

In June 2020, Dolkun Isa, the President of the World Uyghur Congress, requested Sir Geoffrey Nice, known for prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic, to chair the Uyghur Tribunal. The Uyghur Tribunal was structured as an independent “people’s tribunal” and composed of nine panelists, all based in the United Kingdom. The panel reflected varied professional expertise and received independent legal guidance on applicable international law.⁸

The Tribunal investigated allegations of torture, crimes against humanity, and genocide directed at Uyghur, Kazakh, and other Turkic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. It examined witness testimony, records, government and independent reports, and expert opinions. The Tribunal applied the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard in its findings. It focused on China’s state responsibility rather than individual criminal responsibility.⁹

The Tribunal's Factual Conclusions

On December 9, 2011, the Tribunal delivered its judgment. In its judgment, the Tribunal established the following facts. Hundreds of thousands to over one million were arbitrarily detained and exposed to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Testimony described overcrowded cells, sometimes holding around 50 detainees in roughly 22 square meters (or 237 square feet), with little space to lie down. Detainees used buckets as toilets, monitored by Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), with no privacy.¹⁰

Detainees were tortured without any legitimate reasons. Witnesses identified a range of torture practices, such as fingernail removal, beatings, extended immobilization in “tiger chairs,” immersion in cold water, and confinement in cages too small to stand or lie down. Multiple testimonies described long-term heavy shackles and restraints, in some cases lasting for months.¹¹

Widespread sexual violence occurred, affecting both male and female detainees. One account described the gang rape of a young woman, about 20 or 21, in front of roughly 100 other detainees forced to watch. Female detainees faced sexual assaults with electric devices and metal rods. Some were raped by people who paid for access to detention facilities. Witnesses reported severe food deprivation (sometimes withheld as a punitive measure), solitary confinement in dark or always-lit cells, long-term sleep deprivation, and humiliation.¹²

Deaths were linked to abuses in detention. Testimony indicated that younger detainees were occasionally taken from cells and subsequently disappeared. However, there is no evidence of systematic mass killings. In fact, many detainees were eventually released. Some were released after three to six months, others after years of imprisonment or repeated torture, though often only to be detained again.¹³

Witnesses described various forms of nonphysical mistreatment, including mandatory political indoctrination where detainees were required to sing pro-CCP songs under threat of punishment. Detainees were given unidentified pills or injections, sometimes causing reproductive or psychological changes. Witnesses described unexplained blood draws and medical procedures. Testimonies included coerced abortions with some late terms, and claims of newborns killed after delivery.¹⁴

Surveillance outside detention facilities was pervasive.  Large areas of Xinjiang were monitored, especially for Uyghurs and other minorities, using facial recognition and other advanced technologies. Neighbors, family members, and community members were encouraged or forced to spy on each other. Seemingly harmless actions could result in detention, causing family separation, loss of employment, and exposure to abuse.¹⁵

Testimony reveals the disappearance or detention of political leaders, religious figures, business leaders, and cultural advocates, some of whom died or were killed in custody. Children were often separated from their families and placed in state-run boarding schools or orphanages, sometimes without notifying parents. Women underwent invasive birth control measures, including involuntary hysterectomies and sterilizations. Uyghur women were pressured to marry Han men, with refusal risking imprisonment for them or their relatives.¹⁶

“Family friends,” primarily Han men, were placed into Uyghur homes. These individuals monitored families’ daily routines, religious practices, and social behavior.  In some cases, they slept in the same bed as Uyghur women when male family members were detained. This arrangement led to accounts of sexual harassment, non-consensual sexual acts, and cultural and religious intrusions. Children were also interrogated.¹⁷

A large-scale, organized system of forced labor was implemented across Xinjiang and in other parts of China. Individuals that were transferred to work programs were frequently separated from their families and housed in segregated dormitories. Satellite images showed hundreds of new or converted factory facilities, some integrated with the detention system.¹⁸

Religious and cultural sites were systematically destroyed. Approximately 16,000 mosques (around 65% of those in Xinjiang) were demolished or damaged. Cemeteries and other sacred sites were bulldozed or repurposed. Everyday expressions of Islamic faith, such as praying, studying Islamic texts, wearing headscarves, growing beards, or refraining from alcohol and pork, were criminalized and punished with long prison sentences.¹⁹

Use of the Uyghur language was penalized. Children were denied education in their native language and punished for speaking it. Entire neighborhoods were demolished, and residents were forcibly relocated far from home. Residents reported losing property, land, financial assets, and businesses to state confiscation or redistribution to Han individuals.²⁰

Evidence showed that repression also occurred beyond China’s border. Uyghurs living abroad often received threats directed at them or their relatives in Xinjiang, and many lacked information about the fate of family members. Relatives of those who spoke publicly about conditions in Xinjiang were imprisoned, sometimes for extended periods. The Chinese government also used economic leverage to pressure other countries to return Uyghurs to China, where their fate remained uncertain.²¹

Ethnic Uyghur demonstrators take part in a protest against China in Istanbul, Turkey, October 1, 2021. [Image credit: Dilara Senkaya / Reuters]

Issue of the State's Plan

Evidence gathered by the Tribunal reveals that the Chinese government and the CCP committed extensive, systematic abuses against Uyghurs and other minorities. Around 2014, tensions between Uyghur communities and the Han-dominated state deepened, particularly as incidents of violence expanded beyond Xinjiang. The CCP responded by initiating what it labeled as “War on Terror,” a counterterrorism campaign, portraying Uyghur and other Muslim minorities as potential security risks. Concurrently, these initiatives supported broader government goals, deepening economic integration and tightening regional control.²²

Soon after taking national leadership in 2013, Xi Jinping visited Xinjiang in 2014. During this visit, Xi Jinping called for “an all-out ‘struggle against terrorism, infiltration, and separatism…that would absolutely show no mercy.’”²³ In 2016, Chen Quanguo, previously known for implementing stringent security policies in Tibet, assumed the role of Party Secretary of Xinjiang. The following year, Xinjiang authorities adopted the “De-Extremification Regulation,” which formalized the “re-education internment” program.²⁴

In July 2019, Governor Shohrat Zakir publicly reiterated support for Xi Jinping’s regional policies. By 2018, these policies intensified with directives to “break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections.”²⁵ These policies gradually developed into an interconnected system of regional, local, and community-level policies. The measures included “birth control, sterilisation, forcible labour transfer, placement of children into state boarding schools and orphanages, imposition of Han into Uyghur homes, destruction of mosques and mass internment.”²⁶ Officials were subject to incentives and punishments tied to enforcement, and the system was supported by an extensive surveillance architecture. Taken together, these controls rendered much of Xinjiang functionally akin to an “open air prison.”²⁷

The Tribunal determined that the above-mentioned policies required the construction of hundreds of buildings and the deployment of thousands or hundreds of thousands of personnel, all at a high financial cost. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that such an extensive state repression system could not exist without authorization at the highest levels of government and direction for implementation across all layers of governance. The Tribunal also concluded that the Chinese government had developed a comprehensive plan to carry out a series of interconnected policies targeting the Uyghurs.²⁸

Issue of State Responsibility

China functions as a highly centralized party-state in which the CCP holds overarching authority, and the state bureaucracy serves largely as its implementing mechanism. The system features minimal institutional separation, with major policy directions set by the Party leaders and executed through state administrative bodies. Centralization trends have accelerated under Xi Jinping’s leadership. During his tenure, constitutional limits were abolished, Xi Jinping expanded his authority over the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the “Xi Jinping thought” was codified in the Party constitution. Xi Jinping’s administration has tied ethnic policy to narratives of national security and rejuvenation, facilitating the rollout of assimilationist measures with limited institutional resistance.²⁹

The Tribunal concluded, on the evidence presented, that ultimate responsibility for the abuses rested with senior CCP and state officials, including Xi Jinping and Chen Quanguo. While no direct orders from Xi Jinping or other senior leaders were documented, the Tribunal found that the abuses were a foreseeable result of the policies and directives issued under their authority. The Tribunal also emphasized that China’s hierarchical governance structure made it unlikely that such measures would proceed without approval, explicit or tacit, from top leadership.³⁰

The Tribunal determined that China’s detention and penal systems systematically subjected detainees to “barbaric, cruel, and sadistic torture.” It identified no meaningful evidence of disciplinary actions against officials involved in abuses, noting the system’s tight vertical control.³¹

According to the Tribunal, sexual violence, including rape, was pervasive and systematically perpetrated, with authorities either aware of or complicit in its occurrence.³²  

Satellite images suggested large-scale damage or destruction affecting roughly two-thirds of the region’s mosques. Religious cemeteries and other sacred locations were also subject to demolition. Numerous religious expressions, including prayer, mosque attendance, and Islamic dress customs, were penalized and could have resulted in imprisonment or torture. The Tribunal concluded that these measures formed a coordinated effort to suppress and effectively eliminate Uyghur religious life.³³

Several witnesses testified to the unexplained detention or disappearance of numerous relatives. One testimony described the disappearance of 14 nieces and nephews, with no updates on their fate. Witnesses offered thousands of comparable accounts involving detained relatives or friends. The Tribunal concluded that China maintained a vast detention system holding hundreds of thousands, and possibly over a million, Uyghurs without meaningful legal process.³⁴

China revised its one-child policy in 2016, permitting two children per family, and further expanded the limit to three children in 2021 amid national concerns about declining birth rates. Before these changes, ethnic minority families in Xinjiang were permitted to have more children, typically two in urban areas and up to four in rural areas. Starting in 2017, authorities launched an intensive, region-wide crackdown on what they classified as “birth control violations.” By 2019, authorities implemented large-scale reproductive examinations, with long-term contraceptive measures applied to a substantial majority (80%) of women of reproductive age in southern rural prefectures. Data suggested unusually high intrauterine device insertion rates in Xinjiang compared to the national average, alongside sterilization rates estimated at between 14% and 34% of women of reproductive age.³⁵

Testimony included allegations of forced abortions, including late-term procedures, and claims that some newborns were killed in hospitals. Statistics show steep declines in birth rates across southern Xinjiang, with some counties reporting stagnant or negative growth. In some Uyghur-majority counties, birth rates dropped dramatically between 2011 and 2015, where data suggest declines by 58.5%, with some exceeding 65%. For instance, in Hotan County, the reported birth rate fell from approximately 25.41% per thousand to just 7.41% per thousand by 2018.³⁶

Some demographic projections suggest that current policies could reduce the Uyghur population by 2.5-4.6 million (20%-34%) by 2040 relative to expected growth. Demographic decreases appear heavily concentrated in Uyghur-majority counties, while Han-majority areas have seen comparatively minor shifts. Beijing’s approach blends policies that encourage Han settlement, facilitate the movement of minorities out of the region, and sharply restrict Uyghur reproductive growth. The Tribunal found that Chinese authorities implemented a sustained, systematic effort to reshape Xinjiang’s demographics by severely reducing Uyghur and other minority births.³⁷

Data from 2017 to 2019 indicate a substantial increase in the number of Uyghur children placed in Han-administered boarding schools, with official figures showing a 43.5% increase, reaching 880,400. According to official explanations, these programs aimed to distance children from their families’ cultural influence. In numerous cases, separations occurred by default, since one or both parents had been detained, leaving children no option but state placement.³⁸

The Tribunal reviewed a range of evidence, including satellite imagery, documenting hundreds of large factory facilities—some built near or integrated with detention sites. State-run outlets claimed that participants in labor programs reached hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, including 611,500 in Hotan alone in 2018. The Tribunal concluded that, although framed as “poverty alleviation,” the programs primarily advanced state economic, political, and security objectives.³⁹

Key Legal Standards

The Tribunal relied on three primary bodies of international law to make its findings: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute of the ICC).⁴⁰

China ratified the Convention against Torture in 1988. The Convention defines torture as:

“…any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”41

The Tribunal also noted relevant case law. In Prosecutor v. Kunarac, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that “[e]ven if the perpetrator’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering is a likely and logical consequence of his conduct.”⁴²

The Rome Statute of the ICC, which entered into force in 2002, defines crimes against humanity as “…any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack…” [emphasis added].⁴³  It then enumerates the 11 qualifying acts, including:

1. “Murder;

2. Extermination;

3. Enslavement;

4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;

6. Torture;

7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;

8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender [male and female], or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the [ICC];

9. Enforced disappearance of persons;

10. The crime of apartheid;

11. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”⁴⁴

Drawing on Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the Tribunal explained the evidentiary elements required.

“An ‘attack’ is not limited to the use of force but encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population.

‘Widespread’ refers to the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of targeted persons.

‘Systematic’ refers to the ‘organized nature of the acts of violence’. The existence of a plan or policy can be indicative of the systematic character of the attack, but it is not a distinct legal element. The perpetrator—the perpetrator actually doing the relevant act for crimes against humanity—must know that there is a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and that his or her acts are part of that attack but need not have detailed knowledge of the attack or share the purpose of it.”⁴⁵

China ratified the Genocide Convention in 1983. The Convention defines genocide as “…acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group…”⁴⁶

The prohibited acts include:

1. “Killing members of the group;

2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 

3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”⁴⁷

Tribunal's Legal Findings

Applying the Convention against Torture, the Tribunal found that all witnesses who testified regarding Xinjiang’s detention facilities reported the deliberate infliction of severe physical or psychological suffering consistent with torture. It found no evidence of disciplinary measures taken against perpetrators, despite recurring allegations of abuse and indications of highly centralized administrative control. Accordingly, the Tribunal determined, applying a “beyond reasonable doubt” standard, that torture had been perpetrated or tolerated with the knowledge, consent, or acquiescence of the state or Party official during the relevant period.⁴⁸

Applying the Rome Statute, the Tribunal concluded that mass detentions, cultural and religious destruction, coercive reproductive policies, language and religious suppression, and family separations collectively amounted to an unjustified attack on the Uyghur population. It found that the campaign was widespread, spanning the entire region and involving large-scale internment, mosque demolitions, and pervasive interference in everyday Uyghur life. Although the measures were implemented region-wide, the Tribunal observed that their intensity was greatest in southern Xinjiang, where Uyghurs form the majority. It also deemed the campaign systematic, citing technology-enhanced surveillance systems such as the Integrated Joint Operating Platform. The Tribunal determined that several qualifying acts—for crimes of humanity, deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape and enforced sterilization, persecution, enforced disappearances, and other inhuman acts—were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.⁴⁹

Applying the Genocide Convention, the Tribunal found that Uyghurs qualify as a distinct ethnic, racial, and religious group under the Genocide Convention. It held that the evidence supported two Convention-prohibited acts: measures aimed at preventing births and the forcible transfer of children. Applying the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard, the Tribunal concluded that China’s sustained campaign to curb Uyghur births reflected an intent to destroy a substantial part of the group, thereby meeting the legal threshold for genocide.⁵⁰

Although the Tribunal reached these legal conclusions, it emphasized its lack of enforcement authority. It cannot sanction state actors. However, the Tribunal urged that its findings be used by policymakers, civil society groups, and international organizations to promote accountability efforts.⁵¹

Conclusion

The Uyghur Tribunal’s findings assemble a substantial evidentiary record documenting widespread human rights abuses against Uyghurs (and other Turkic Muslim groups) in Xinjiang. Synthesizing witness statements, expert analyses, and extensive documentation, the Tribunal determined that Chinese authorities perpetrated torture, crimes against humanity, and genocide against Uyghurs.

Although the Tribunal lacks enforcement authority, its findings serve as an important source of documentation and a foundation for future accountability efforts. It emphasizes the roles of states, international bodies, and civil society groups in advancing accountability, supporting independent inquiries, and protecting affected communities. The report underscores the continuing responsibility of states, international organizations, and civil society to pursue meaningful action, support independent investigations, and advocate for the protection of vulnerable populations. In recognition of the victims and survivors of the abuse in Xinjiang, the World Uyghur Congress designated December 9 as Uyghur Genocide Remembrance Day to mark the Tribunal’s ruling.

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Glossary

Accountability - The obligation to explain, justify, and take responsibility for one’s actions.

Acquiescence - Agreement or consent by silence or without objection.

Arbitrary detention - When a person is arrested or held by a government without legal justification, due process, or a fair trial.

Assimilationalist measures - Policies or actions designed to integrate minority groups into the dominant culture.

Autonomous region - A territory within a country that has significant self-governance and control over local affairs while remaining part of the larger state.

“Beyond reasonable doubt” standard - The burden of proof, generally in a criminal proceeding, that requires a very high degree of certainty, leaving no doubt based on reason and common sense.

Centralized party-state - A political system where a single ruling party concentrates all governing power, controlling the state’s administration, economy, and society.

Counterterrorism - Activities that are intended to prevent terrorist acts or to eradicate terrorist groups.

Crimes against humanity - Any of the acts, listed in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.

De-Extremification Regulation - A set of rules implemented by the Chinese government to suppress “extremist” behavior.  It criminalizes virtually all Uyghur religious and cultural practices, such as growing beards and wearing veils.  It establishes the basis for a mass internment re-education system.

Disciplinary measures - Corrective actions taken by organizations to address behavior or performance that violates established rules, aiming to correct conduct and maintain standards through a structured process.

Enforced disappearance - A grave human rights violation where state agents or state-condoned groups secretly abduct, arrest, or detain someone, then deny involvement or refuse to disclose their fate or whereabouts, placing them outside legal protection.

Enforcement authority - Any government body, agency, or authorized entity with the legal power to ensure compliance with laws, regulations, or rules.

Extremists - People who hold extreme or fanatical political or religious views, especially those who resort to or advocate for extreme actions.

Forced abortions - The termination of a pregnancy without fully informed consent of the pregnant person.

Genocide - Any of the acts, listed in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial, or religious group.

Great Leap Forward - A Chinese Communist Party-led campaign to industrialize China and increase its agricultural production.  The campaign directed labor toward heavy industry, especially steel, while reorganizing farming practices.

Integrated Joint Operating Platform - A data-driven mass surveillance and predictive policing system used by the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang.

Intrauterine device - A contraceptive device fitted inside the uterus and physically preventing the implantation of fertilized ova.

One-child policy - A strict family planning program limiting most urban families in China to one child to curb rapid population growth.

People’s tribunal - A civil society-led forum that convenes experts to investigate alleged human rights violations.

Political indoctrination - The process of instilling specific political beliefs, values, or ideologies in individuals.

Prefectures - Administrative divisions, similar to states, provinces, or counties, serving as a regional or local government area governed by an official called a prefect.

Separatist - A person who supports the separation of a particular group of people from a larger body on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or gender.

“Strike Hard” campaign - Counterterrorism efforts directed at Xinjiang and particularly the Uyghur ethnic minority.

Systematic - Following a deliberate, methodical plan or system, characterized by order, thoroughness, and regularity.

Terrorists - People who use unlawful violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.

Testimony - A formal written or spoken statement, especially one given in a court of law.

Tiger chairs - Wooden or metal chairs used as a form of interrogation and torture, in which detainees are shackled or strapped to for an extended period of time (e.g., hours or days).

Torture - Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for specific purposes outlined in Article 2 of the Convention against Torture.

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Footnotes/Sources

¹ CIA. “China - the World Factbook.” www.cia.gov, Central Intelligence Agency, 2025, www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/.

² OHCHR.  “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China.”  OHCHR, 31 Aug. 2022, 3-4, www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region.

³ Minority Rights Group.  “Uyghurs in China.” Minorityrights.org, Mar. 2024, www.minorityrights.org/communities/uyghurs/.

⁴ Id.

⁵ Id.

⁶ Id.

⁷ OHCHR, “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” 4-5.

⁸ The Uyghur Tribunal.  Uyghur Tribunal Judgment.  9 Dec. 2021, xxi, v, 1, 4, www.uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/UT_Judgment_E-PDF_activelinks_20Feb2023_FINAL.pdf. 

⁹ Id. at vi, 1-2, 12, 15, 17.

¹⁰ Id. at 1, 7.

¹¹ Id. at 8.

¹² Id.

¹³ Id. at 9.

¹⁴ Id. at 12.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ Id. at 13.

¹⁸ Id. at 13, 45.

¹⁹ Id. at 13, 39.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ Id.

²² Id. at 34.

²³ Id.

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ Id.

²⁶ Id.

²⁷ Id.

²⁸ Id. at 35.

²⁹ Id. at 36.

³⁰ Id. at 38-39.

³¹ Id. at 39, 58-59.

³² Id.

³³ Id. at 39-40.

³⁴ Id. at 40.

³⁵ Id. at 40-41

³⁶ Id. at 42-43.

³⁷ Id. at 44-45.

³⁸ Id. at 45.

³⁹ Id. at 45-46.

⁴⁰ Id. at 2.

⁴¹ Id. at 49.  United Nations, “Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” OHCHR, United Nations, 1984, Article 1, www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading.

⁴² The Uyghur Tribunal.  Uyghur Tribunal Judgment, 49.

⁴³ United Nations. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” OHCHR, United Nations, 17 July 1998, www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court.

⁴⁴ Id.

⁴⁵ The Uyghur Tribunal.  Uyghur Tribunal Judgment, 49-50.

⁴⁶ United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 177, 9 Dec. 1948, Article 2, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4.

⁴⁷ Id.  For a full discussion of the legal standard, see The Uyghur Tribunal.  Uyghur Tribunal Judgment, 50-58.

⁴⁸ The Uyghur Tribunal.  Uyghur Tribunal Judgment, 58-59.

⁴⁹ Id. at 59-60, 62.

⁵⁰ Id. at 64, 67.

⁵¹ Id. at 69.