Trujillo and the Erosion of State Authority in Peru
Author: Maria Fe Mendoza
September 12, 2026
HRRC recognizes the Trujillo attack as a serious indication of the erosion of state authority in Peru. The ability of criminal groups to impersonate state agents, alongside persistent weaknesses in police oversight and the justice system, highlights growing challenges to public trust and accountability. Addressing this crisis requires strengthening institutions, ensuring effective oversight, and restoring the state’s capacity to protect communities from organized crime.
![Cathedral of Trujillo, Peru [Image credit: Wikimedia Commons]](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/f05ed1_f60ef9506004440ba26812de280be85b~mv2.jpg/v1/fill/w_960,h_640,al_c,q_85,enc_avif,quality_auto/f05ed1_f60ef9506004440ba26812de280be85b~mv2.jpg)
On August 30, four people were killed and mining businessman Jens Lara was kidnapped in Trujillo, a city on Peru’s northern coast. The attackers intercepted the vehicle carrying the victims while wearing uniforms resembling those of the Peruvian National Police (PNP), and the kidnappers used a vehicle with a fake version of a police license plate. Lara was released more than 30 hours following the murder of the other four civilians. The fact that criminals were able to impersonate state agents exposes a deeper dimension of Peru’s security crisis: the authority of a weakened institution can be easily appropriated by those seeking to exercise violence.
Trujillo, the capital of the La Libertad region, is attempting to manage a large-scale expansion of extortion, kidnapping, and contract killings. Criminal organizations in this area evolved from operating locally to developing criminal networks that extend across other countries in the region. Violence persists even after states of emergency and police operations, which raises a question that goes beyond understanding the capabilities of criminal groups: why does the Peruvian state struggle to exercise effective authority over territories where organized crime is increasingly commonplace?
Part of the answer lies in the deterioration of the police institution’s legitimacy itself. During the last ten years, the PNP faced allegations of corruption deficiencies in its internal oversight mechanisms, and questions about its ability to investigate and prevent crime. A 2025 analysis by the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP) found that 57.5% of surveyed police officers believed that sanctions for corruption within the institution were not effectively enforced. These deficiencies do not mean that the entire police force is corrupt or that its officers are responsible for criminal violence. However, they do contribute to a loss of trust in an institution whose effectiveness depends, to a significant extent, on its legitimacy.
The problem is also reflected in cases in which police officers have faced investigations or disciplinary proceedings over possible links to criminal organizations. In Trujillo in 2025, for example, three police officers were subjected to an internal disciplinary process after appearing in a photograph with alleged members of Los Pulpos, one of the city’s most powerful criminal organizations. Other cases have raised concerns about information leaks and the exchange of sensitive information between law enforcement and criminal networks. Even when such allegations have yet to be proven in court, they can contribute to the perception that institutions responsible for combating organized crime may themselves be vulnerable to criminal influence.
This institutional crisis is compounded by a legal framework that has been criticized by human rights organizations. Between 2023 and 2025, Peruvian Congress approved several reforms called “pro-crime laws.” Human Rights Watch has argued that some of these measures have weakened the ability of prosecutors and judges to investigate organized crime and created obstacles to certain investigations. Law 32108, for example, changed the legal definition of a criminal organization and introduced procedural requirements that specialists criticized for making certain investigative measures more difficult. Although the law was later amended, it became one of the clearest examples of the tension between procedural safeguards, investigative capacity, and the fight against organized crime.
The death of Police Subofficer Diego Vela Rodríguez, which occurred only hours after the attack, adds another layer of uncertainty. Rodriguez was at the same nightclub as the other victims, and was wearing a wristband from the establishment when he was found dead. Still, authorities have not established a connection between his death and the kidnapping, and conflicting accounts remain regarding the circumstances of his death.
The Trujillo case, therefore, reveals more than a security crisis. It reveals a crisis of state authority and institutional legitimacy. A police force perceived as inefficient or vulnerable to corruption loses its ability to generate trust; a legal system that makes investigations more difficult can further damage that fragile trust; and, increasingly-organized criminal groups can occupy the space left by weakened institutions. Addressing this crisis requires more than simply deploying more police officers, weapons, or states of emergency. It requires rebuilding an institution capable of investigating, preventing, and prosecuting crime and, above all, restoring public trust.
Glossary
Authority – the power to give orders to people
Extortion – the act or practice of extorting especially money or other property
Legitimacy – the quality or state of being legitimate
Organized crime – a group of professional criminals who work together as part of a powerful and secret organization
State – a politically organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory
Trujillo – is a city in coastal northwestern Peru and the capital of the Department of La Libertad
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