The Human Rights Cost of Internet Shutdowns in South Asia

Author: Sheikh Sibghat Ullah

September 17, 2026

The 2024 Bangladesh protest movement at Central Shaheed Minar. [Image creidt: Nahidhasan027/Wikimedia Commons]

I. The Internet as Human Rights Infrastructure

Internet access is not generally recognized as a standalone human right. It is, however, a major instrument for the enjoyment of freedom of expression and other such rights. Nowadays, digital connectivity is essential for daily life, such as communication, education, employment, financial transactions, as well as for journalism and political participation. A 2025 GSMA survey in India found that among mobile internet users, 67 per cent used it to read news, 58 per cent for education or learning support, 54 per cent for government services and 47 per cent for online banking or mobile money.  When governments limit that connectivity, the consequences, therefore, go beyond mere inconvenience and often result in human rights violations.

Internet shutdown does not necessarily mean shutting down the entire network. It can be categorized as a total blackout, bandwidth throttling, or blocking certain communication platforms, preventing access to platforms, or rendering them unusable.  Internet shutdowns, although reserved for exceptional emergency situations only, are becoming frequent among various countries, especially during conflicts, protests, elections, and political crises. According to Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition, there were at least 313 internet shutdowns in 52 countries in 2025, with at least one happening every day of the year. This represents a substantial increase from past years. The coalition documented 55 shutdowns in 2016, which, compared to 313 in 2025, is five times more than the number recorded in 2016. 

South Asian countries continue to be at the heart of the shutdown trend. In 2025, India had 65 shutdowns, whereas Pakistan had at least 20. These governments are quick to cite national security, public order, and misinformation as reasons and justifications for the shutdowns. However, they are used as a tool of state control to impede journalism, access to information, and essential medical services. 

II. Internet Shutdowns and the International Human Rights Framework

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is an international human rights treaty that legally binds countries that have ratified it to respect and protect a wide range of civil and political rights. Although the ICCPR does not expressly recognise a standalone right to internet access, its protections apply to the digital sphere as well. General Comment No. 34 confirms that Article 19 covers electronic and internet-based forms of communication, while General Comment No. 37 states that governments should not block or hinder internet connectivity in connection with peaceful assemblies. Under this treaty, Article 19 provides freedom to seek, receive, and impart information by any media. Similarly, Article 21 guarantees freedom of peaceful assembly, and Article 25 guarantees the right to participate in public affairs and to genuine elections. In the event of a violation of these rights, Article 2 requires an effective remedy. However, we see that the governments are allowed to restrict the right of expression in exceptional cases. Even then, these restrictions can only be placed for the purposes specified in the Covenant. According to General Comment No. 34 of ICCPR, restrictions on expression must be grounded in publicly accessible and sufficiently precise law, serve a permitted aim, and be strictly necessary and proportionate. The standard of “permitted aim” is recognized by the ICCPR and has been interpreted to include circumstances such as protecting national security, public order, public health, or the rights of others. The principle of “necessity” requires governments to demonstrate a specific threat and prove that less restrictive measures would not have been effective. Similarly, the principle of proportionality requires that the restriction be limited to its geographical reach, duration, and impact. For example, disabling an entire network would be disproportionate where harmful content on one platform could be addressed through a targeted measure.  General Comment No. 34  also states that no law can give the authorities unfettered discretion. States should not obstruct or interfere with internet access in relation to peaceful gatherings and blanket restrictions are presumptively disproportionate. The ICCPR applies directly to most of South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are parties to the treaty, while Bhutan is not. 

The UN Human Rights Council has firmly denounced actions taken to deliberately obstruct access to online information in breach of international human rights standards. The OHCHR report on internet shutdowns is even more explicit. It states that the blanket shutdowns should never be used, and exceptional cases must be based on clear legislation, necessity, and proportionality, and must be limited, independently authorized, publicly explained, and subject to meaningful remedies. 

Thus, invoking national security or public order alone does not satisfy these requirements; the state must still demonstrate that the restriction is lawful, necessary, and proportionate. The state needs to provide legitimate reasons rooted in law and public policy to explain why the internet limitation is lawful, what alternative measures are available, and why less intrusive measures would not be effective in countering the given threat.

III. Internet Shutdowns as Tools of State Control in South Asia

The practice of shutting down the internet has become a common occurrence in South Asian countries, which extends beyond the threshold of exceptional cases. The use of internet shutdowns becomes clearer in politically sensitive contexts. This is evident from the Kashmir blackout that happened in 2019. Mobile, internet, and landline services were suspended throughout Kashmir in August 2019, just before the passing of the constitutional Order 272  concerning the applicability of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir. This blackout was described by UN experts as a form of collective punishment. Similarly, in Pakistan, mobile services were shut down nationwide during the general elections held in February 2024, blocking access for voters, journalists, and election observers; and internet access was also suspended for 20 out of 22 days in July 2024 during an uprising in Bangladesh. Not only that, in 2025, Access Now documented four shutdowns in Afghanistan and two in Nepal, while Sri Lanka had previously imposed short-term platform restrictions during political unrest. The broader pattern is therefore regional; although the frequency and form of restrictions vary considerably between states, the pattern remains the same. 

Digital control through such shutdowns and restrictions can take different forms. For instance, prolonged 2G restrictions continued to affect Kashmir, whereas Pakistani authorities blocked access to X, a crucial platform used to access the latest news. Bangladeshi authorities restricted internet access through blackouts and throttling, platform blocking, deactivation of cache servers, and blocked VPNs. These techniques may not create a total blackout but they can still interfere with communication, mobility, and reporting.

The allowance of internet shutdowns is being integrated within the legal and administrative landscape by proposing amendments in the thresholds or by passing new laws. This pattern is common among several South Asian countries, including India and Pakistan. At present, India's framework is guided by Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act 2023 and the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules 2024 (replacing the 2017 Rules). According to the 2024 Rules, the orders must be published and must contain the written reasons, identify the geographical area and service to be affected, not exceed 15 days, and must consider whether the objective can be achieved in another reasonable manner. The Rules also require suspension orders to be reviewed by a Review Committee, which consists of executive officials, and must meet within five days of the suspension order. During the rule-making process, commentators warned that the exceptional powers would be used routinely because there is no express prohibition on more than one order being issued in succession, and there is no clear definition of “public emergency” or “public safety.”

There are parallel systems of control on networks and internet platforms in Pakistan as well.  The Supreme Court of Pakistan noted that only specific and limited preventive cellular suspensions are permissible under the Policy Directive 2009 and Section 8(2)(c) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act of 1996. This may seem legitimate; however, the authorities expand their control and power under different laws.  For instance, the government can restrict online content and social media platforms under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 (amended 2025) and the Blocking Rules 2021 under the garb of national security. Such frameworks use internet connectivity as a tool for administrative control rather than a means for exceptional circumstances.

There are procedural and judicial safeguards in place that limit the power of the government to practice arbitrary internet shutdowns. In Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, the Supreme Court of India ruled that internet suspension orders cannot be indefinite and must be published, proportionate, and subject to periodic review. The significance of the ruling is that the publication of suspension orders allowed the affected parties to challenge such orders before the court of law. The Supreme Court also confirmed that such orders remain subject to judicial review. However, the enforcement of this ruling and the standards set out herein remains uneven. It is evident from the subsequent litigation on Kashmir's 2G restrictions, which led to the referral of the internet shutdown to a Special Committee rather than an instant restoration of 4G access.

There are some safeguards present in India's Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules 2024, but there is still a requirement of post hoc review by the executive instead of the judiciary. Throughout the region, timely scrutiny of internet shutdowns is still hampered by security concerns, informal or unpublished directions, and delayed official recognition. The regional pattern is not simply repetitions of shutdowns, but the normalization of shutdowns and the flexible application of these by means of digital control mechanisms and administrative decision-making.

IV. The Human Rights Cost

Shutting down the internet can interfere with the exercise of human rights, including freedom of expression, education, health care, employment, and civic participation. The harm to these basic rights is greatest at times of protest, election, and armed conflict when people are most vulnerable and in need of reliable information, emergency services, and proper communication channels. In 2025, different conflicts, including armed conflict, were the leading trigger for internet shutdowns. Access Now documented 125 conflict-related shutdowns across 14 countries, representing 40 per cent of the global total. The consequences were more severe in Afghanistan, where shutdowns in 2025 cut off more than 43 million people and later hampered emergency communications and lifesaving response during a deadly earthquake. At least 70 shutdowns in 21 different countries also coincided with grave human rights abuses, including murder, torture, rape and apparent war crimes. The OHCHR has warned that prolonged or repeated shutdowns can obstruct independent reporting, interrupt online education and urgent medical care, impede humanitarian assistance, disrupt public services, and cause losses for businesses and workers. 

One of the initial victims of these shutdowns is the free flow of information. Journalists do not have access to sources, citizens cannot disseminate evidence, and human rights monitors cannot verify events. This creates a vacuum which makes it harder to confirm official claims and to record violations. For example, during the August 2019 communications shutdown in Jammu and Kashmir, the executive editor of the Kashmir Times argued before the Supreme Court that she had been unable to publish the newspaper from 6 August 2019. She argued that the restrictions disrupted newsgathering, reporting, publication, circulation, and information dissemination, with the Srinagar edition remaining unpublished until 11 October 2019.  Bangladesh's restrictions in 2024 coincided with a time of notable social and political turbulence, significantly restricting the public's ability to communicate and to independently verify events.

Economic and social rights are also directly affected by shutdowns. According to the OHCHR report on internet shutdowns, online schooling, communication between schools and families, emergency medical care, delivery of medicine, and health professionals' communication have all been affected. It also warns about disruptions in humanitarian supply chains, data collection, and monitoring of humanitarian assistance. Businesses lose contact with their customers and workers, and ongoing restrictions threaten jobs and other essential services. The cumulative effect of these disruptions is that a temporary measure can lead to students losing learning content, patients losing essential guidance, and local organizations losing the ability to arrange support. 

Political participation also comes under threat due to internet shutdowns. Digital tools have become an integral part of campaigning, election discussion, informing the public, reporting and election monitoring. A ban on mobile services during the 2024 general election in Pakistan disrupted communication, affecting how voters, journalists, and election observers shared information. The impacts of the shutdown vary across different groups, particularly among less-resourced groups, including women seeking support services and small businesses and communities reliant on mobile connectivity, as they have fewer alternatives available. Shutdowns further exacerbate inequalities and lessen visibility of those impacted. Their human rights cost lies not merely in disconnecting people but in cutting them off precisely when communication is most needed.

V. Accountability Gaps

The accountability gap does not arise simply from the absence of laws and rules. It also arises due to the government's broad powers, limited transparency, and ineffective review mechanisms that often operate only after internet shutdowns take effect. For instance, as stated previously, under India’s Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules 2024, the government is required to consider alternatives. If those aren't available, then publish suspension orders for the shutdowns, give reasons, specify the geographical area and services affected, and ensure that these do not last more than 15 days. The Rules also require suspension orders to be reviewed by a Review Committee, which consists of executive officials, and must meet within five days after an order is issued. However, the composition of the committee having executive members only means that scrutiny is internal and happens after the restrictions have been implemented. It is evident from the case of Anuradha Bhasin where the Supreme Court of India made the standards of publication, proportionality, and periodic review obligatory, but eventually, the litigation over Kashmir's 2G was sent to a Special Committee, which did not result in instant restoration. The concern was that the Committee itself consisted entirely of senior executive officials, so the question of continuing the restriction remained with the executive rather than resulting in immediate judicial relief. The wider communications restrictions had begun on 4 August 2019, while mobile internet was only gradually restored at 2G speeds from January 2020. Full 4G access was eventually restored in the remaining districts on 5 February 2021, following advice from the Special Committee and a review of the security situation. 

Similarly, there is a fundamental issue of transparency, especially in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, internet access was blocked in 2024 based on informal and undisclosed instructions. In Pakistan, the blocking of X, although a platform-level restriction rather than a network-wide shutdown,  was only admitted in a court filing nearly two months after access to the platform was restricted. Such delay complicates the identification of the responsible authority and hinders investigation of evidence and access to urgent relief. In 2024, the UN Human Rights Committee made recommendations to Pakistan to end arbitrary shutdowns, website blocking and platform bans and to implement independent supervision over internet censorship and throttling. This is consistent with the OHCHR's benchmark that any action restricting access must be based on clear legislation, independent authorization, public explanation, and meaningful redress. The problem, therefore, is not simply whether safeguards exist on paper, but whether they provide independent, timely, and transparent scrutiny in practice; where review remains internal or occurs only after implementation, it risks becoming retrospective validation rather than effective oversight.  

VI. Rights-Respecting Digital Governance

A rights-respecting approach does not mean that governments are required to ignore real dangers to public safety. It calls upon them to react in a lawful, evidence-based, and narrowly tailored manner. In practice, this requires safeguards before a shutdown is authorised, while it is enforced, and after it is ended. 

Before issuing a shutdown order, the responsible authority should prepare a written necessity assessment identifying the specific threat and explaining why less restrictive measures would not address it. Except where alternatives are not available, and an immediate action is unavoidable due to public safety, a shutdown should require prior approval by an independent judicial or statutory body on the basis of the written necessity assessment. Urgent orders should instead receive prompt independent review after issuance. Any restriction that continues in force should be reconsidered at fixed intervals specified in the original order and before any extension.  Any renewal should require a fresh necessity assessment and independent approval, and successive orders should not reset the maximum duration unless materially changed circumstances are recorded,  and affected persons should have access to urgent judicial relief.

Governments should maintain public documentation of shutdowns and disclose the legal grounds, duration, and impact of such measures. Transparency alone, however, cannot cure an unlawful or disproportionate shutdown; published orders must remain open to rapid independent challenge and effective remedies, coupled with the necessity assessment.  Authorities should prioritize targeted takedown, counter speech, fact-checking, or normal criminal investigation over blocking entire networks. National security cannot serve as a rationale for actions that exceed the actual threat. Security powers that are exceptional, transparent, and independently reviewable are the key to digital governance legitimacy.

VII. Conclusion

Shutdowns in South Asia are now becoming more common as a tool of state control, as opposed to being used as an exceptional emergency measure. A similar pattern is visible in Kashmir, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, where restrictions are put in place during elections, protests, constitutional change, and armed conflict, often by means of general and broad legal provisions and unclear executive decisions.

The repercussions are more than just loss of connectivity. Shutdowns impede journalism, emergency communications, education, livelihoods, and humanitarian support and hinder political participation while disproportionately impacting communities with limited options. Where procedural safeguards are in place, the executive-dominated review and delayed judicial remedies tend not to deter abuse.

While governments could be under legitimate security threats, this does not justify indiscriminate digital isolation. Any restrictions must be exceptional, lawful, necessary, proportionate, transparent, and subject to independent assessment. Human rights and democratic accountability depend on protecting digital access, which is why it goes beyond telecom policy.

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Glossary

Bandwidth throttling: The deliberate slowing of internet speeds so that websites, videos, messaging applications or other online services become difficult or effectively impossible to use.

Blanket shutdown: A broad restriction that disables internet or telecommunications access for an entire population, geographical area or category of users, rather than targeting a specific threat.

Cache server: A server that stores temporary copies of frequently accessed online content to improve speed and availability. Disabling cache servers can significantly slow access to websites and digital services.

Counterspeech: The use of accurate information, public explanation or alternative viewpoints to respond to false, harmful or inflammatory content without suppressing lawful expression.

General Comment: An authoritative interpretation issued by a United Nations treaty body explaining the meaning and scope of rights contained in a human rights treaty.

ICCPR: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a binding international treaty protecting rights including freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, political participation and access to an effective remedy.

Internet shutdown: An intentional disruption of internet or electronic communications by, or on behalf of, a government, affecting an entire network, a geographical area, particular services or selected platforms.

Meaningful redress: An effective process through which affected people can challenge an unlawful restriction and obtain enforceable relief from a competent authority. 

OHCHR: The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the principal United Nations body responsible for promoting and protecting human rights.

Platform blocking: Restricting access to a particular website, application, messaging service or social-media platform without necessarily disabling the wider internet.

Post-hoc review: Examination of a shutdown or blocking order after it has already taken effect, rather than before its implementation.

Proportionality: The requirement that a restriction must not be broader or more harmful than necessary to achieve its legitimate objective and that less intrusive alternatives must be considered.

2G and 4G restrictions: Measures that limit mobile internet users to slower 2G connectivity instead of permitting higher-speed 4G access. Restricting users to 2G may leave nominal connectivity available while making modern websites, video, online learning and other data-intensive services largely unusable.

VPN: A virtual private network that encrypts a user’s internet connection and may allow access to websites or services blocked within a particular country or network.