Military Coups in the Sahel: A Step Forward for Decolonization and a Step Backwards for Human Rights

Author: Santino Calcagno

July 18, 2025

A supporter of the military junta displays a sign that reads “No to a military intervention” during a protest in Niamey, Niger. [Image credit: Issifou Djibo/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock]

Introduction 

Since 2020, the sub-Saharan Sahel region of West Africa has seen a resurgence of military coups destabilizing democratically elected leaders, disrupting a nearly six-year period of regional stability in which there was not a single undemocratic change of government (Kante et al. 3 ; Aning and Bjarnsen). Considering the subregion’s history of civil conflicts and violence, this drought of military coups was truly a remarkable feat (Center for Preventive Action). As of now, nearly every country in the Sahel is under military rule, prompting policymakers to characterize the region as a “Coup Belt”, stretching across the continent from Guinea to Sudan (Page and Camara). However, three regimes have made international headlines after breaking away from their traditional alliances and presenting a united front against their foes. The Sahelian countries in question are Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The leaders of each state’s respective military junta are Assimi Goita (Mali), Ibrahim Traoré (Burkina Faso) and Abdourahamane Tchiani (Niger), each characterized as authoritarian strongmen who share a resentment towards the West and Africa’s regional security mechanisms; especially mechanisms established under the framework of the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS (Ndiaye). Created to promote West African economic integration, ECOWAS has evolved over the years in response to rising violence and has become a central figure for maintaining regional stability and good governance. However, several flaws and inconsistencies have earned ECOWAS a loss of respect among the three Sahelian states. 

As a response to political corruption and insufficient solutions to an ever-growing conflict with violent extremists, these military leaders led their forces to overthrow civilian rule (Kwarkye). All three Sahelian states are united under similar values: their dissatisfaction with ECOWAS, their antagonism towards their former French colonizers, and their cooperation with other undemocratic superpowers such as Russia (International Crisis Group). These factors led Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to officially withdraw from ECOWAS and establish a new regional confederation known as the Alliance of Sahel States or AES (International Crisis Group). This regional schism raises questions about ECOWAS’ normative framework and its legitimacy for maintaining stability (Ndiaye). For example, why have they been unable to provide an effective counterterrorism strategy? Why have they been so quick to condemn military coups while being so complacent towards civilian leaders who manipulate constitutions to extend their terms? 

The creation of the AES also raises concerns for the protection of human rights and civil liberties (The Observatory). Considering these regimes are all authoritarian, it is unlikely that they will hold each other accountable for good governance and the rule of law, meaning that conflict-related abuses, media censorship, repression against dissidents, illegal arrests, and torture are all more likely to go unpunished and unregulated. 

Building Public Support Through the Instrumentalization of Grievances

Initially, the military juntas received public support because of a growing disillusionment with elected civilian leaders and their responses to violent extremism. The junta leaders have compounded this support by blaming France and ECOWAS for their insecurity and instability. It is important to acknowledge that these junta leaders are simply instrumentalizing an unresolved bitterness towards France’s colonial legacy in order to legitimize military rule. They have diverted the public’s attention towards a common enemy while they attempt to consolidate power and undermine democracy. They have undermined democracy in many ways, starting with postponing their countries democratic transitions and intentionally delaying elections. They have also diminished the political and civic space by suspending political parties and censoring journalists and foreign media channels. When these leaders frame their authoritarian regimes under the pretext of decolonization and pan-Africanism, the public feels a sense of national pride and reassurance in their identity (Columbia Encyclopedia). This “anti-western” veil, of sorts, prevents the population from seeing these regimes as what they truly are: military governments that have zero tolerance for public dissent or political opposition and have no intention of complying with democratic norms. The arbitrary arrest and forced disappearance of journalists, human rights defenders, and activists in all three countries, along with the suspension of political parties in Mali and Burkina Faso, illustrate this point. Furthermore, the postponement of democratic elections and the use of excessive violence against civilians during counterterrorism operations highlights the dark path that all three states are heading toward.

It is important to recognize that these accusations of blame towards France and ECOWAS are somewhat grounded on verifiable evidence. France has maintained an economic presence in its former colonies through the CFA Franc monetary zone, which ties the value of currency of 12 former colonies directly to the euro (King). This system has been criticized for limiting the economic sovereignty of former colonies and diminishing per capita growth (Signé). It is for this reason that military leaders in Burkina Faso and Niger have recently spoken out about potentially abandoning the CFA franc and setting up their own monetary union in the Sahel (Ferdjani). 

Moreover, France has maintained a strong military presence in the Sahel, which has sparked criticism and outrage among populations (AFP). Most notably, Operation Barkhane was established in August 2014 to fight against terrorism in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad (Châtelot). Barkhane lacked clear parameters and objectives, as opposed to its relatively successful predecessor, Operation Serval, which specialized in liberating towns in Northern Mali captured by jihadist groups: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Eddine (Center for Preventive Action). During Operation Barkhane, the French army was tasked with securing an extensive area, larger than Iraq and Syria combined, with less than 5,000 men. Ultimately, Barkhane was unable to restore peace and prevent further jihadist expansion because of its narrow focus on security; this failed to address the deeply rooted political and governance crises that allowed these jihadist groups to grow stronger (Doxsee et al.). 

Motivated by the failures of Operation Barkhane, all three Sahelian juntas terminated their defense agreements with France starting in 2022, leading to the withdrawal of all French troops and the expulsion of French diplomats from all three countries (Frossard de Saugy; Abdulqadir). Moreover, Burkina Faso and Mali have abandoned French as an official language, cutting off cultural ties that they perceived as keeping the colonial legacy alive (Rédaction Africanews). Emmanuel Macron pushed back and insisted that France’s military campaigns were a success and that without them, “the majority of these countries would have already been taken by jihadists,” (TFI Info). Macron also claims that “Françafrique”– the controversial term used to describe France’s informal sphere of influence in Africa, no longer exists (Ng). Macron and his predecessor's similar statements bolster the juntas’ anti-Western narratives by failing to acknowledge the consequences of their colonial legacy and persistent economic and military intervention in Africa. 

ECOWAS’s similar track record of lackluster security mechanisms has also made it a scapegoat for Sahelian states. Since 2012, ECOWAS’s member states have established cross-border military operations to fight the influx of armed extremists in the Sahel from a conflict that began in Mali and then spilled over into neighboring countries (International Crisis Group; Center for Preventive Action).  However, these operations failed to receive sufficient funding and were ultimately relegated to a sideline role as the counterterrorism agenda was mostly dominated by Western actors, particularly Operation Serval and UN peacekeeping missions.

Additionally, ECOWAS’s use of hard-line measures in response to the 2023 coup in Niger fueled Sahelian distrust and antagonism toward the body. In order to incentivize the return to democratic rule, ECOWAS employed crippling sanctions in Niger, which further exacerbated social and economic hardships for its citizens (International Crisis Group). On top of this, ECOWAS imposed an ultimatum onto the Nigerien military officials, threatening a military intervention if they did not return to democratic rule (Taylor). These measures were framed as “illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible” by the Sahelian military authorities (Kante et al. 6). Since civilians were greatly affected by these sanctions, anti-ECOWAS sentiment began to rise on the streets and on social media (International Crisis Group). Ultimately, the threat of military intervention in Niger was the final grievance that prompted Mali and Burkina Faso to join the country in an anti-ECOWAS coalition. 

Put simply, are the Sahel states truly attempting to decolonize and reinforce their national identity? By mobilizing a sense of Pan-Africanism and rejecting France’s colonial legacy, it would seem that these leaders are leading the Sahel towards a more independent future, in which they no longer have to depend on Western powers or regional authorities to ensure their security against extremist threats (Kuryla). From the images of massive crowds holding signs that say “Down with France” and waving French flags with X’s through them, these countries appear to be striving towards full-fledged decolonization (France 24). However, these governments may be using this narrative as a tool to serve their own power-driven interests and legitimize their authority over their citizens. It is unlikely for a country to rebuild as an independent decolonized state with a strong national identity if it lacks a democratic system that incorporates the entire population's voices, regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity.

Deterioration of Human Rights and Democratic Norms 

By breaking away from ECOWAS, the regional body that holds states accountable for undemocratic governance, the Sahelian military juntas seek to rule with limited restrictions on their power. Limited restrictions on power have put these states at severe risk of human right violations, such as arbitrary arrests, illegal use of force to silence dissent, and extrajudicial killings–committed by perpetrators who enjoy total impunity (Daoud and Sivieude). 

Mali 

According to the 2024 World Report by international NGO Human Rights Watch, the human rights situation in Mali has significantly deteriorated (World Report Mali). As Mali’s security operations have moved away from French and ECOWAS intervention, its military forces have instead engaged with the Russia-linked Wagner Group in order to take on the Islamist threat. Since 2022, Malian armed forces and allied foreign fighters—apparently from Wagner Group have committed hundreds of unlawful killings of civilians and forcibly disappeared several dozen civilians in the country’s central region (“Mali: New Atrocities”). Under the banner of fighting Jihadist groups, with little oversight or accountability, these operations have led to the deaths of innocent civilians, including women and children, as well as illegitimate arrests and torture (Amnesty International). The military government has also undermined efforts to investigate these atrocities, allowing for impunity to persist for past and ongoing conflict-related abuses. 

Additionally, the military junta has significantly reduced Mali’s civic space. They have threatened, harassed and forcibly disappeared journalists and civil society activists (Mali-U.S Department of State).  In April 2024, the junta suspended political parties and associations until July, after they accused opposition parties of posing a danger to an ongoing national dialogue regarding Mali’s future (Crowe et al; Le Monde and AFP). The government’s communications regulatory body ordered all media channels to stop broadcasting and publishing activities of political parties (“Mali: Junta Suspends”). This decision came as a response to nearly 80 political parties and associations that urged the military junta to hold presidential elections and return to civilian rule. 

Four years since the country’s latest unconstitutional change of government, Mali remains in a supposed transitional state. However, the duration of the transition remains uncertain as elections have already been postponed indefinitely for “technical reasons” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies).  Increased internal pressures for a democratic transition are swiftly dealt with through arbitrary arrests, violent crackdowns on protests, and restricting media channels and political parties. Mali’s distancing from ECOWAS has also allowed its military junta to face less external pressure for a democratic transition. The junta seems to be operating wholly unrestricted with no accountability for excessive conflict-related violence and the violation of civil and political rights. 

Burkina Faso 

The human rights situation in Burkina Faso has also significantly deteriorated since 2023 (World Report Burkina). Their military junta postponed democratic elections until 2029 in favor of the continued reign of interim leader, Ibrahim Traoré (Nunoo). Military forces, alongside civilian auxiliaries, known as Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), have been responsible for unlawful killings and forced disappearances of hundreds of civilians during their counterterrorism operations (“Burkina Faso: Arming Civilians”). Burkinabè military forces have summarily executed massive crowds of civilians, the most notable example being the 2023 Karma Massacre, where at least 156 civilians were executed in the Northern Yatenga province (“Burkina Faso: Army Linked”).  Under the guise of fighting extremism, Burkinabè soldiers looted and burned villages they suspected harbored Jihadist fighters or accomplices. The military forces have also carried out forced disappearances of several public figures, abducting people from their homes and providing few details as to where they are being held and what their conditions are (Human Rights in Burkina Faso).  

Burkinabè authorities have cracked down on French-affiliated media channels and local dissidents. French reporters have been expelled and international French media outlets have been suspended, further enforcing an anti-French policy (World Report Burkina). President Traoré’s extensive powers to combat the Islamist insurgency allow for the restraining of civil liberties and commandeering of people and goods. As a result, at least a dozen journalists, civil society activists and opposition party members were conscripted to participate in security operations across the country (World Report Burkina). The military junta also operates with impunity, avoiding accountability for violence and rights violations. Burkina Faso’s regime is taking traditionally authoritarian steps, raising concerns for its unresolved security crisis. This is made evident by the combination of mounting civilian deaths with weakening freedoms of speech and press. 

Niger 

Similarly in Niger, the human rights situation has drawn international attention towards the military junta's restrictions on freedom of expression and the erosion of civic space (World Report Niger). Violence also broke out following the 2023 coup, as vigilante committees made up of military junta supporters attacked members of ousted President Mohamed Bazoum’s party, the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (World Report Niger). The violence is believed by human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch to have been a result of political tensions over ECOWAS’ threatened military intervention. Following the coup, the junta arbitrarily arrested several officials from Bazoum’s ousted government and charged the former President with high treason and undermining national security by military court (Ochieng and Chothia). Bazoum and his wife have remained in detention for almost 550 days in the presidential palace, cut off from the outside world (Chemam). 

Niger’s repression of freedom of expression echoes its Sahelian allies by repressing media channels; local and international journalists have been attacked, arbitrarily arrested, intimidated, threatened, and cyber-harassed. Local retransmissions of Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24 have been indefinitely suspended by the junta, further isolating the population from reliable international news sources (World Report Niger). 

Following the deportation of nearly 20,000 migrants of multiple nationalities from Algeria to its border with Niger, concerns have been raised as current logistical and financial resources in Niger are not adequate to care for all migrants (Human Rights in Niger). Moreover, Niger's borders were closed after the July coup, leaving thousands of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers stranded in the country under worsening humanitarian conditions. In contrast to Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger’s military regime has not proven to be as violent and repressive towards its citizens. Nonetheless, since Niger’s regime is the latest one to develop out of the three, human right observers should continue to keep an eye out for conflict-related abuses. 

A demonstrator taking part in a march carries a sign reading "Down with France, long live the CNSP" ("National Council for the Protection of the Fatherland") in Niamey, Niger, on July 30, 2023. [Image credit: Djibo Issifou / picture alliance via Getty Images]

Conclusion 

As research from human right monitoring organizations has shown-each military regime that makes up the AES confederation has been implicated in serious atrocities and violations of civil and democratic liberties (Amnesty International). Additionally, the populations in these countries face the imminent threat of jihadist organizations that continue to persist in a decade-long conflict affecting the Sahel as a whole. The execution of civilians, the lack of accountability for human rights abuses,  the prolongation of democratic elections, along with the crackdowns on media and dissent, help illuminate these regimes for what they truly are: violent and heavily repressive authoritarian states.

Despite employing reforms intended to deconstruct France’s colonial legacy these states can no longer be allowed to justify their use of extreme force and repression. Although the negative effects of France’s sphere of influence in Africa and the pitfalls of ECOWAS are plentiful, it is important to reiterate that the juntas’ use of anti-French and anti-ECOWAS sentiment is manipulative toward their aims of boosting public support and further legitimizing their undemocratic regimes. The resulting human rights situation in each country highlights that these regimes are not interested in carrying out a decolonial transformation. Replacing oppressive structures in power, not substituting them, should be the goal of their national transformations. In the words of Mariano Moreno, one of the founders of Argentina’s first national government 

“If people are not enlightened, if their rights are not made known, if each man does not know what he can do, what he is worth and what he should be, new illusions will succeed the old ones and it will perhaps be our fate to change tyrants without destroying tyranny” (Lipovetsky). 

Despite justifying their unconstitutional changes of government by highlighting democratically elected leaders’ corruption and targeting their nations’ open wounds of colonialism, they have simply substituted the alleged tyrants with a further oppressive and repressive system of governance. The juntas have empowered their people to believe in a promising future free from foreign intervention, one where African affairs are dealt with by African leaders only and where French colonial legacies are no longer culturally nor institutionally present. This vision is what the AES confederation stands for; unfortunately it is an empty promise used to justify their violent military operations and their disregard for the rule of law. There is a sharp contrast between the decolonial ideals the Juntas claim to believe in and the actual actions they have taken to back them up. How can a state claim to be fighting for the security and cultural independence of its citizens if by doing so, it has actually made its people much more vulnerable to human rights abuses? This paradox rips right through the AES’ proclaimed motto of decolonization and national security, highlighting their true authoritarian nature. They have unlawfully killed and arbitrarily arrested citizens out of suspicion and placed barriers for the freedom of expression and the freedom of press by violently repressing against dissidents. Ultimately, the juntas are becoming as dangerous as the initial threat they claimed to be fighting against.

Moving forward, it is important to keep an eye on this region as neighboring countries, who face serious security threats, may find themselves attracted to the AES' ideals. The possibility of the confederation’s membership spreading throughout the Sahel and West Africa should immediately concern human rights organizations and regional bodies in charge of promoting stability.  

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Glossary 

• Alliance of Sahel States: A regional political and economic bloc containing Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger located in the Sahel region. 

• CFA Franc monetary zone: The monetary system that governs the currency of West African nations previously colonized by France. The CFA Franc is tied directly to the Euro.

• Commandeering: Taking control of something for military purposes.

• Counterterrorism: The use of military force and intelligence operations to fight terrorist groups and violent extremism.

• Decolonization: The process in which a country’s institutions are freed from the cultural and social effects of colonization. 

• Dissidents: People who oppose and disapprove of their respective government, especially a military regime.

• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): A regional political and economic 

• bloc consisting of 12 member countries located in the Western African region.

• Impunity: Exemption from being held responsible or facing punishment for an action.

• Military intervention: When the military gets involved to resolve a political crisis and instability, usually using force.

• Military Junta: A government that is led by a country’s military forces, usually with the highest in command in charge. 

• Pan-Africanism: A nationalist movement that aims to strengthen solidarity and unity within African countries and the diaspora. 

• Regulatory body: An organization made up of several actors whose responsibility is to oversee and monitor the actions of a designated group and make sure that they are not in violation of any principles or laws.

• Schism: A split or division between opposing parties due to a difference in beliefs.  

• Terrorist Accomplices: Any individual, organization, or institution that is affiliated in any sort of way with the activities of a terrorist organization.

• The West: Refers to countries of Western Europe, as well as any country that has been shaped by Western European culture, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

• Torture: Inflicting severe pain and suffering onto others in order to interrogate or punish them.

• Undemocratic: In violation of democratic principles. 

• Vigilante: A group of people using force to enforce the law without having any legal authority.

• Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland: Civilian-led militias used to fight jihadist organizations in Burkina Faso.

  
  

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41. TFI Info. “L’Interview d’Emmanuel Macron Au 20H de TF1 - REPLAY .” YouTube, 24 Sept. 2023, youtu.be/DXTMIiVtlOY?si=gHuO0Z45aMazKv_l. 

42. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. “Regional Convergence of Repression of Human Rights Defenders in the Sahel.” International Federation for Human Rights, 21 Feb. 2025, www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/regional-convergence-of-repression-of-human-rights-defenders-in-the. 

43. “World Report 2024: Rights Trends in Burkina Faso.” Human Rights Watch, 11 Jan. 2024, www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/burkina-faso#4550f7. 

44. “World Report 2024: Rights Trends in Mali.” Human Rights Watch, 11 Jan. 2024, www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mali. 

45. “World Report 2024: Rights Trends in Niger.” Human Rights Watch, 11 Jan. 2024, www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/niger.