The Chiquita Brands International: A History of Corporate Abuse and Human Rights Violations

Author: Danielle Castano, MA

February 11, 2026

Workers pack green bananas at the Santa Cruz plantation in Ciudad Hidalgo, Chiapas, Mexico. Bananas from the plantation are shipped to clients including Chiquita, the leading US banana distributor. [Image credit: John Moore/Getty Images]

Chiquita Brand International (CBI), originally founded as the United Fruit Company (UFC) in 1899 and renamed in 1984, is a globally recognized produce supplier best known for banana distribution. Since its inception, the company has been involved in unethical labor practices that have directly resulted in various human rights violations, including the suppression of labor activism, the exploitation of workers, and the funding of armed conflicts in Colombia. The UFC established banana republics across the Americas, dominated by impoverished workers and controlled by wealthy elites or foreign corporations. The UFC repeatedly exploited its workers but was rarely held accountable. The company is also responsible for supporting dictatorships in Central America, encouraging or supporting the United States (U.S.) to stage coups against smaller nations, and funding paramilitary groups that commit murder, forced disappearances, and kidnappings (Schotter and Teagarden, 2010). While many of these crimes occurred decades ago, banana plantation farmers still face similar issues such as brutality against striking workers, the widespread use of union-busting, and mass dismissals (Hough, 2012). In recent years, there have been increasing concerns about the human rights responsibilities of businesses, particularly with respect to violations committed in countries where transnational corporations have substantial investments (Olson, 2015). The illegal actions taken by CBI serve as a case study supporting the notion that corporations should be held accountable for supporting unethical practices in foreign countries, as their influence can result in large-scale human rights violations that transcend national borders.

A History of Human Rights Abuses: Two Case Studies

1928 Banana Massacre in Colombia

The former UFC established a large-scale operation in Colombia beginning in 1899, where it quickly developed major infrastructure including railroads, plantations, and residences. Ciénaga, a municipality in the Magdalena Department, was the site of a booming banana economy where approximately 150,000 workers were devoted to gathering banana crops for the UFC in the Great Caribbean Basin, with 16.7% being Colombian (Vidal Ortega and Elías Caro, 2022). The UFC was nicknamed “El Pulpo” (the octopus) due to its ability to outcompete its competition through the dominance of transportation networks, thus extending its metaphorical “tentacles” throughout the Americas by impacting transnational shipping methods (Glasius, 2023). The company had significant economic and political influence through its production and distribution network that included plantations, hospitals, roads, railways, telegraph lines, housing facilities, ports, and a steamship fleet (Glasius, 2023). The protests began because the UFC indirectly hired workers through subcontractors to reduce costs and avoid legal labor benefits (Vidal Ortega and Elías Caro, 2022). The working conditions in Ciénaga, led workers to present a list of demands on October 22, 1928, which included the following: a petition for a six-day work week, compensation for work accidents, an increase in wages for workers earning less than 100 pesos per month, and recognition as employees of the UFC (Oralkan, n.d.). The manager of the UFC, Thomas Bradshaw, refused the demands and claimed that the workers were not employees of the company and thus were not entitled to additional benefits. This statement prompted the workers to organize a strike on November 12, 1928, which lasted for nearly a month (Archila Neira and Torres Cendales, 2009). Between 16,000 and 32,000 workers participated in the strike, representing a majority of those employed in Ciénaga at the time (Archila Neira and Torres Cendales, 2009). In order to continue operations, the UFC hired strikebreakers, however, strikers quickly blocked transportation routes (Bucheli, 2005). As a result, Bradshaw, along with the Governor of Magdalena, asked Colombian President Miguel Abadía Méndez to intervene and claimed that the strike could pose a threat to national security (Bucheli, 2005). Shortly thereafter, President Méndez sent an army battalion, led by General Carlos Cortés Vargas, and a negotiating commission to Ciénaga to pacify the situation.

Through its vast production and distribution network, the UFC exerted political and economic influence over local and national authorities, often through bribery and with U.S. support (Glasius, 2023). American governmental intervention was not uncommon; between 1898 and 1994, the U.S. government intervened successfully to influence Latin American governmental structures a total of 41 times, with at least 17 of these cases involving military intervention (Coatsworth, 2005). During the strike, the UFC used its connection to the U.S. government to pressure the U.S. to threaten to invade Colombia if the Colombian government did not act to protect the UFC's interests, using the claim of potential communist subversion to garner support (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). The UFC influenced the local newspapers that reported on these events and encouraged portraying protesters as communists who needed to be stopped by the U.S. government (Lazzarino-Buendia, 2023). The U.S. Ambassador stationed in Bogotá requested the U.S. to send a warship to stand by to protect UFC investments (Godoy, 2022). Tensions between the UFC, the strikers, and the Colombian army continued to rise. 

On December 5, 1928, strikers received a decree from the Governor of Magdalena to disperse; they subsequently accused the local authorities of defending the interests of the UFC rather than supporting their desire for fair labor practices (Vidal Ortega and Elías Caro, 2022). The army battalion that arrived at Ciénaga in mid-November gave the strikers fifteen minutes to disperse before opening fire on the crowd. Although casualty estimates vary, the U.S. Ambassador to Bogotá reported more than 1,000 deaths (Chappell, 2024). There was no trial for the soldiers, nor for the general involved, and the UFC was not held liable in any way for the deaths of its employees. Chaprasi (2024) notes that to satisfy UFC interests, the armed forces of the government indiscriminately assassinated a group of workers who were only demanding improvement to their livelihood. While the UFC did not independently carry out the murders of over 1,000 workers, its influence on the Colombian government contributed to this tragic event. 

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

Between 1997 and 2004, the now CBI made payments totaling $1.7 million to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, also known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), in exchange for protection of its operations in the country (Chappell, 2024). The AUC consisted of a coalition of far-right paramilitary groups whose objective was to stop the expansion of left-wing guerrilla forces in Colombia. At the time, Colombia was in the middle of an armed conflict between two guerrilla groups, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), that began in 1964 (The International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008). The AUC has been found responsible for committing crimes against civilians, including forced displacement and disappearances, land grabbing, kidnapping, and extortion (InSight Crime, 2024). At the time, the AUC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the U.S. (Evans, 2024). The company claimed during the lawsuit that the payments regularly made to the AUC were to protect company employees during Colombia’s civil war and were made under duress in order to save employees’ lives (Democracy Now!, 2024). However, the claims were dismissed after the court found that CBI could not prove that the AUC’s assistance was necessary (Márquez Velásquez, 2024). Eventually, CBI reached a sentencing agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) after admitting to paying the AUC; CBI was forced to acknowledge that the payments were a federal crime, as it is illegal for a U.S. corporation to provide money to a non-state political actor, especially one openly associated with terrorism. CBI became the first U.S. corporation convicted of financial dealings with terrorists (Schotter and Teagarden, 2010). Shortly after the sentencing, victims of the AUC began bringing civil suits against CBI.

Non-U.S. citizens pursuing claims on the basis of human rights violations outside of the U.S. turn to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which allows for non-U.S. citizens to bring civil actions before U.S. courts in certain situations (Hipp et al., 2024). In 2010, 144 plaintiffs sued CBI through the U.S. District Court of New Jersey on behalf of over seven hundred Colombian nationals allegedly killed or injured by the AUC. The case was later consolidated into a multidistrict litigation item put before the Southern District of Florida (Brunk, 2024). The plaintiffs alleged that CBI provided financial support to the AUC with the knowledge that the funds would support acts of terrorism, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; however, two U.S. Supreme Court rulings led to the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ ATS claims (Brunk, 2024). A new lawsuit was taken to federal court in Ohio and Florida alleging that CBI was liable under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) for the kidnapping and murder of an American, and also claimed that Chiquita employees and executives were liable for injuries to Colombian nationals under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) (Brunk, 2024). In 2016, CBI moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, which refers to a court's discretionary power to decline to exercise its jurisdiction where another court may more conveniently hear a case. The company argued that Colombia would be a better forum for hearing the claims, and the Florida district court rejected this argument stating that hearing the claims in Colombia would endanger the lives of the plaintiffs (Brunk, 2024). In 2019, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the case against Chiquita and other defendants because it considered an indictment in the Colombian Justice and Peace process to be inadmissible hearsay (Partners In Justice, 2025). In 2022, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s 2019 dismissal of the case, allowing the case finally to proceed to a jury trial. In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit found substantial evidence of paramilitary involvement in the killings the victims allege Chiquita is responsible for (Partners In Justice, 2025). On June 10, 2024, a jury in West Palm Beach, Florida found CBI responsible for the killings of eight out of the nine family members of the plaintiffs committed between 1997 and 2004 by the AUC (Chappell, 2024). The jury calculated the damages suffered as a consequence of the death of the plaintiffs involved and ordered compensation of $38.3 million. This lawsuit marked the first time that a U.S. federal jury has found an American corporation responsible for financing human rights violations in foreign countries. The ruling demonstrates that corporations committing human rights abuses should and can be held responsible for the crimes they commit in foreign countries, opening up the possibility for other corporations to face similar legal accountability.

Conclusion

CBI and its predecessor, the UFC, have a long history of committing crimes against workers. The two case studies discussed above represent only a limited portion of the broader pattern of abuse and exploitation associated with the company. There are more cases of labor exploitation and unethical practices in countries where the company was operating in the past. Even though the abuses committed by CBI/UFC occurred decades ago, banana plantation farmers continue to face similar abuses such as brutality against striking workers, the widespread use of union-busting, and mass dismissals (Hough, 2012). It is worth continuing to investigate the role of corporations that commit similar crimes abroad and whether they are held accountable. 

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Glossary

• Accountable - Someone who is accountable is completely responsible for what they do and must be able to give a satisfactory reason for it.

• Appealing - A legal proceeding by which a case is brought before a higher court for review of the decision of a lower court.

• Banana Republic - A politically unstable country with an economy dependent entirely on revenue from exporting a single product or resource, such as bananas or minerals.

• Compensation - Money that is paid to someone in exchange for something that has been lost or damaged or for some problem.

• Corporation - A corporation is formed under state law by the filing of articles of incorporation with the state.

• Guerrilla - A person who engages in irregular warfare especially as a member of an independent unit. 

• Jurisdiction - The power, right, or authority to interpret and apply the law.

• Liable - Having legal responsibility for something or someone.

• Paramilitary groups - Paramilitary groups are organized like an army but are not official and often not legal.

• Predecessor - A person who had a job or position before someone else.

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